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ARTICLES

Righting Others’ Wrongs
A CRITICAL LOOK AT CLAWBACKS IN MADOFFTYPE PONZI SCHEMES AND OTHER FRAUDS
Amy J. Sepinwall†
INTRODUCTION
We typically expect wrongdoers to redress the victims of
their transgressions.1 But do those who innocently benefit from
wrongdoing owe restitution to the victims of the wrong? Irving
Picard, the trustee who has been charged with recovering and
distributing money to the victims of Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi
scheme, obviously thinks so.2 Picard has filed over one
†
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1
See, e.g., 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 82
(1859) (“The liability to make reparation for an injury rests upon an original moral
duty, enjoined upon every person, so to conduct himself or exercise his own rights as
not to injure another.” (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)); John C.P. Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress
of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 541-44 (2005) (describing the goal of tort law as seeking
redress for private harm). For a searching review of the ways in which federal agencies
have acted to compel disgorgement from wrongdoers and, in some cases, have then
sought to return ill-gotten gains to the wrongdoers’ victims, see generally Adam S.
Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011).
2
See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) defines a Ponzi scheme as “an investment fraud that involves the
payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new
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thousand clawback suits,3 seeking to recover any money
“winning investors” realized in excess of their investment and
to return this money to the Madoff “losers,”4—i.e., those who
lost some or all of their principal when the Ponzi scheme went
bust.5 Kenneth Feinberg, former Special Master for the
September 11 Victims Compensation Fund,6 therefore quips
that the Madoff clawback suits have Picard “taking from Peter
to pay Paul.”7 Importantly, the “Peters” in these suits include
entities or individuals who are believed to have been innocent of
any wrongdoing—there is no allegation that they knew or
should have known of the fraud.8 Thus, the Madoff case provides
investors.” SEC, Ponzi Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
3
Times Topics: Irving H. Picard, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/
reference/timestopics/people/p/irving_h_picard/index.html (last updated June 25, 2012);
see also Lisa Sandler & Bob Van Voris, Madoff Trustee Defends “Clawbacks” in U.S.
District Court, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2011, 9:10 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-08-23/madoff-trustee-defends-1-6-million-clawback-suit-in-u-s-district-court.html.
4
I follow the bankruptcy trustee in referring to those who had withdrawn
amounts equal to or greater than their principal investment as “winners,” and to those
who had not yet recovered all—or perhaps even any—of their principal when the
scheme collapsed as “losers.” Nonetheless, I note that this is a tendentious way of
describing the two categories of investors, since it implies that there is something
undeserved about the money the “winners” obtained. See Clarence L. Pozza, Jr. et al., A
Review of Recent Investor Issues in the Madoff, Stanford and Forte Ponzi Scheme Cases,
10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 113, 117 (2010) (“Ponzi scheme investors . . . are often regrettably
characterized as ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ This dichotomy tends to prejudge the equitable
collection of funds and distribution to Ponzi victims.” (footnote omitted)).
5
See, e.g., David Ellis, Madoff Investors May Have to Cough Up Profits,
CNNMONEY (July 26, 2010, 10:52 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/26/news/
companies/madoff_investors/index.htm; Ashby Jones, Madoff “Winners” Beware: Irv
Picard Hasn’t Gone Away, WSJ LAW BLOG (July 26, 2010, 9:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2010/07/26/madoff-winners-youre-forewarned-irv-picard-hasnt-gone-away/.
6
See, e.g., Margaret L. Shaw, Madoff Victim Compensation: Interview with Ken
Feinberg, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2010, at 11. Kenneth Feinberg has also overseen
compensation funds for victims of the Virginia Tech shootings, the BP oil spill, and
Holocaust reparations. See generally FEINBERG ROZEN, LLP, http://www.feinbergrozen.com/
(last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
7
See Shaw, supra note 6, at 11.
8
I rely here on a standard definition of fraud. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY FREE ONLINE (2d ed.), http://thelawdictionary.org/fraud/ (last visited Sept.
7, 2012) (“Fraud consists of some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with
intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury.”). While
many of those who have been targeted for clawbacks are innocent of the fraud, see, e.g.,
Richard Sandomir, Actions of Madoff Victims’ Trustee Will Be Reviewed, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 2011, at B15, Picard alleges that many others knew or should have known.
Most prominent among those whom the trustee accuses of having known about, or else
been willfully blind to, the scheme, are Fred Wilpon and Saul Katz, real estate moguls
and part owners of the New York Mets, who had invested their company’s revenues
with Madoff. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Madoff’s Curveball: Will Fred Wilpon Be Forced
to Sell the Mets? NEW YORKER (May 30, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2011/05/30/110530fa_fact_toobin?printable=true&currentPage=all; Bob Van Voris,
Madoff Trustee May Do What Bernie Didn’t: Give Victims Profit, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11,
2011, 12:01 AM), http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-11/madoff-trustee-may-do-
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an opportunity to explore the grounds and bounds of restitution
as between the innocent beneficiaries and victims of a wrong.
We shall see that the questions of whether, when, and
why innocent winners in a financial fraud should be compelled
to restitute the fraud’s losers are both underserved by existing
doctrine9 and understudied by scholars.10 Perhaps nowhere is
something-bernie-never-did-give-victims-real-profit.html. The company used its Madoff
accounts as a kind of bank, depositing money until it was needed for payroll or other
expenses, withdrawing the needed funds, and then beginning the cycle anew. Toobin,
supra; see also Richard Sandomir, Trustee Says Mets Saw Madoff as House Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, at B11. Over the years, Wilpon’s company deposited roughly $700
million, and withdrew roughly $1 billion (the $300 million in excess of the company’s
deposits was taken to constitute profits on the investment). See, e.g., Holman W.
Jenkins, Jr., Madoff and the Mets: How the “Extremely Wealthy” Allowed the Madoff Fraud
to Endure, WALL ST. J. (BUSINESS WORLD) (Feb. 8, 2011, 9:12 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704364004576132201926195.html.
Picard filed a lawsuit against Wilpon and his partners, seeking to claw
back the $1 billion in withdrawals the firm had made from its Madoff accounts over the
years. See, e.g., Michael O’Keefe, Feds To Investigate Irving Picard’s “Clawback” Suits
to See if Madoff Ponzi Scheme Victims Are Hurt, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 28, 2011, 4:00
AM),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-07-28/sports/29840581_1_madoff-trusteewilpon-and-katz-amanda-remus. The trustee maintains that the defendants did know,
or should have known, about the Ponzi scheme, while the defendants vehemently
contest these allegations, calling the claims against them “abusive, unfair[,] and
untrue.” Van Voris, supra. Madoff himself insists upon Wilpon and Katz’s innocence:
“Fred was not at all stock market savvy and Saul was not really either. They were
strictly Real Estate people. Although I explained the Strategy to them they were not
sophisticated enough to evaluate it properly.” See Toobin, supra, at 15 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In a series of rulings, Judge Jed Rakoff reduced the
maximum amount of recovery from the defendants to $384 million. See, e.g., Adam
Rubin, Mets Owners Must Pay, Go to Trial, ESPNNEWYORK.COM (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/new-york/mlb/story/_/id/7647107/judge-new-york-mets-owners-paymuch-83m-trial-decide-303m. On March 16, 2012, Wilpon and partners entered into a
settlement agreement with Picard under which they agreed to pay $162 million to the
trustee. See Richard Sandomir & Ken Belson, Mets’ Owners Agree to Settle Madoff Suit
for $162 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/sports/baseball/mets-owners-pay-162-million-tosettle-madoff-suit.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.
9
General restitutionary doctrine has long been charged with inattention
and incoherence. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and
Constructive Trust, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 267 (1998) (“Most law schools gave up
teaching restitution a generation ago, and many judges and practitioners are not
familiar with its general principles. Lack of familiarity with the restitutionary
elements of the background rules results in a predictable distortion of commercial
law.”); Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 993, 994 (2008) (“[I]n American legal discourse restitution sits at the
backwaters of the academic and judicial consciousness . . . .”). Cf. PETER BIRKS, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 40 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that novel fact patterns pose problems for the
doctrine of unjust enrichment, since there isn’t a general, one-size-fits-all principle for
determining when one party has innocently benefitted at the expense of another). See
generally Mallory A. Sullivan, Note, When the Bezzle Bursts: Restitutionary
Distribution of Assets After Ponzi Schemes Enter Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1589, 1598-99 (2011) (describing the general confusion around restitution, especially in
the context of a bankruptcy).
10
Cf. BIRKS, supra note 9, at 3 (“Of the subjects which form the indispensable
foundation of private law, unjust enrichment is the only one to have evaded the great
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this inattention more apparent, and potentially disquieting,
than in the efforts to require innocent Ponzi scheme winners to
defray the losses of the scheme’s losers. As courts have noted,
the provisions governing the efforts to recover money for
investors in a Ponzi scheme stand “at the intersection of two
important national legislative policies on a collision course—
the policies of bankruptcy and securities law.”11 Neither of these
bodies of law was designed with the other in mind,12 and there
is much that remains unsettled in determining the appropriate
interaction between the two.13
rationalization achieved since the middle of the 19th century in both England and
America by the writers of the textbooks.”).
11
Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting In re Enron
Creditors Recovery Corp., 651 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)); see also
id. at 450 (noting that the clawback lawsuit against Wilpon and his partners “raises
important and in some respects unsettled issues of the interaction of securities law
with bankruptcy law”). Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Why All
Involuntary Creditors Should Be Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 247-48 (2004)
(discussing the untoward interaction of restitution and bankruptcy law).
12
See, e.g., Pozza, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 131 (“The legal principles often
utilized in the Ponzi scheme cases were not originally developed to address Ponzi
scheme victim fairness issues and create somewhat extreme arguments and results.”).
Cf. Kull, supra note 9, at 265-66 (“The contemporary treatment of restitution in
bankruptcy has become confused and haphazard because the subject is not addressed
by the Bankruptcy Code.”); Peter J. Henning, The Roller Coaster Ride Continues for
Madoff Investors, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) (Oct. 3, 2011, 3:26 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/the-roller-coaster-ride-for-madoff-investorscontinues/ (“Investors in Mr. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme have been whipped back and forth
as the courts try to apply the law to a case that is unprecedented in many ways.”).
13
See, e.g., Kathy Bazoian Phelps, Partner, Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz
L.L.P., Fraudulent Transfer Claims and Defenses in Ponzi Schemes, Address Before the
Southwest Bankruptcy Conference (2009), available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/
newsletters/litigation/vol6num5/ponzi.pdf (last visited on Sept. 24, 2012) (“[C]ourts are
continuing to refine the rules which arise in unwinding these tangled financial webs.
In particular, the law regarding fraudulent transfer claims to recover funds paid by the
Ponzi debtor to investors as a return of principal or payment of fictitious profits and
defenses which can be asserted to those claims continue to evolve.”); Joshua Marcus &
Jake Greenberg, Ponzi Schemes: Washed Ashore by Recession’s Low Tide, Reveal
Controversial Issues, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2010, at 48, 107 (“Ponzi schemes—
one of the horrible byproducts unearthed by the financial crisis—have raised
noteworthy and contentious bankruptcy issues.”). Cf. Paul Sinclair, The Sad Tale of
Fraudulent Transfers: The Unscrupulous Are Rewarded and the Diligent Are Punished,
28 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2009, at 16, 80 (“[P]ursuing investors who lacked diligence
in Madoff will unnecessarily cost hundreds of millions.”); Jeff Benjamin, Madoff Investors
May Face Clawbacks, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article20090210/REG/902109979 (quoting an attorney involved in the Madoff clawback
cases, who predicts that, given the unsettled questions of law, “[t]he [civil litigation]
will spawn a whole industry for the next decade.”).
It may be worth noting that there is a prior question as to whether
bankruptcy law should apply at all in the wake of a Ponzi scheme, given that criminal
forfeiture exists as a viable alternative. Supporters of criminal forfeiture argue that it
would be less costly, thereby leaving more money to be distributed to the fraud’s
victims, and more compelling, given its retributive rationale. See generally Marcus &
Greenberg, supra. Bankruptcy looks nonetheless to remain a preferred avenue for
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Even more concerning, few commentators have given
thought to whether the recovery provisions of bankruptcy law
ought to extend to the innocent beneficiaries of a financial
fraud. This is especially troubling because no legal mechanism
exists to permit recovery from investors who innocently profited
from a financial fraud where the fraud does not result in the
entity’s bankruptcy. In this way, Ponzi scheme winners incur
harsher treatment than those who innocently profit from other
kinds of financial fraud, although case law and commentaries do
not offer a justification for this inconsistent treatment. In
particular, outside of the doctrine of unjust enrichment—which, I
argue, is inapposite here—we lack a theory that elucidates why,
and if so when, innocent beneficiaries of a transgression owe
restitution to the transgression’s victims. A central task of this
article is to provide such a theory, which can usefully be applied
not just to Ponzi scheme cases but to other cases of financial
wrongdoing as well—a prospect made all the more pressing in the
wake of the financial meltdown.
More specifically, I examine attempts to extend the
recovery provisions of bankruptcy law to the innocent
beneficiaries of a Ponzi scheme and, after an analysis of the
history and structure of the relevant statutes, I argue that
these attempts problematically deviate from the recovery
provisions’ purpose. I then seek to establish that innocent
winners in a Ponzi scheme are unlike the innocent beneficiaries
of ill-gotten gains or good faith purchasers of stolen goods, and
instead are more akin to investors who innocently profit from
corporate or financial wrongdoing. Yet, so long as the offending
corporations or brokerage firms do not end up bankrupt, the
innocent investors who earned profits as a result of the wrongful
conduct will be permitted to retain their “winnings.” I contend
that if we do not seek to claw back profits from these innocent
investors, then we should not seek to claw back profits from the
innocent Ponzi scheme winners, either.14 That contention, of
restituting the victims of a financial fraud, not least of all because it allows the estate
to recover assets beyond those of the fraud’s perpetrator—of particular relevance here,
those of innocent winning investors. Cf. Paul W. Bonapfel et al., Ponzi Schemes—
Bankruptcy Court v. Federal Equity Receivership, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 207, 21213 (2010).
14
The migration of the noun “clawback” to the verb form “claw back,” appears
to have gained currency in the 1980s, in light of efforts to enforce anti-trust provisions
extraterritorially, and a resulting response permitting the defendant to recoup—i.e., claw
back—damages imposed on him. See, e.g., Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1308, 1318 n.58 (1983) (“[A] number of foreign states have enacted ‘blocking’ or ‘claw-
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course, could cut in two diametrically opposed directions—one
could argue that we should allow the losses to lie where they
fell or, by contrast, that we should implement restitution on a
far wider scale than the law currently allows. I end by seeking
to defend the latter alternative and by suggesting measures
through which it could be implemented.
It is surprising that scholars have largely overlooked
clawback suits in the context of a Ponzi scheme, given the
troubling uncertainty and evident tensions they involve,15 as well
as the dramatic rise in their use. While the first set of clawback
cases eventuating from a Ponzi scheme arose in the wake of
Charles Ponzi’s now infamous fraud16 during the 1920s,17 it was
only in the 1980s that the use of a clawback suit to recover
money from an innocent investor became widespread; in fact,
149 of the 190 published state and federal cases were decided in
or after the year 2000.18 Further, commentators predict that
these suits will become even more common in the coming years.19
To be sure, the Madoff scandal itself has garnered
significant media and scholarly attention. Much of this has
focused on the factors that facilitated the scheme—Madoff’s
exploitation of the affinity bonds he shared with many of his

back’ statutes designed to protect their citizens from assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by the United States.”); Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common
Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1311 n.6 (1985)
(“Clawback statutes, such as § 6 of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980,
ch. 11, follow from the premise that certain foreign judgments will not be given
extraterritorial effect. . . . Once such a statute is invoked, the foreign defendant will be
allowed to ‘claw back’ the punitive portion of the judgment (for example, two-thirds of a
treble-damages antitrust award).” (citations omitted)).
15
Cf. Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 368, 411 (2009) (noting that the term clawback “has been subject to neither rigorous
analytical scrutiny nor definition and exposition”); Robert A. Prentice & Dain C.
Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 15 (2010) (observing
that clawback provisions were “essentially unknown” before Sarbanes-Oxley).
16
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924) (discussing the collapse of
Charles Ponzi’s fraudulent investment program).
17
Ponzi’s scheme gave rise to eleven published opinions, two in state courts
and the remainder in federal court, including two that went to the Supreme Court:
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922), and Cunningham, 265 U.S. 1.
18
See infra notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text (describing the evolution
of the law on this score).
19
See, e.g., Michael C. Macchiarola, In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: A
Response to Professors Cherry and Wong, MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES (2011),
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/headnotes/in-the-shadow-of-the-omnipresent-claw-inresponse-to-professors-cherry-wong-2/#_ftn9 (“As the American economy continues to totter
against an ever-growing populist momentum, it seems likely that clawback mechanisms of
various sorts will be put to increasing use in the coming months and years.”).
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victims,20 his proclaimed split-strike strategy,21 and the SEC’s
failure to detect the fraud.22 Other work has either addressed
alternative enforcement regimes in the case of a Madoff-type
fraud23 or revisited white-collar crime sentencing policies24 in light
of Madoff’s 150-year prison sentence,25 which is likely to be the
longest sentence ever imposed for a violation of an antifraud law.26
The handful of scholars who have addressed the use of
clawback suits against innocent investors in Ponzi scheme
cases have largely agreed that the suits are permissible in
principle, and possibly even worthwhile.27 Existing critical
commentary tends to take issue only with the ways the suits
are wielded in practice. Thus, scholars have objected to judicial
interpretations of the doctrine;28 the ad hoc development of the
law, which threatens uniformity and predictability;29 the
opportunity for abuse of discretion that the suits allegedly
afford;30 or the negative consequences that the suits are
20

See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative):
Bernard Madoff, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 957 (2009); Paul Krugman, Madoff Explains
Everything, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011, 4:24 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/11/17/madoff-explains-everything (“The Madoff affair, as you may know, was a
classic case of ‘affinity fraud.’”).
21
See, e.g., Carole Bernard & Phelim Boyle, Mr. Madoff’s Amazing Returns:
An Analysis of the Split-Strike Conversion Strategy, 17 J. DERIVATIVES 62, 62 (2009).
22
See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three
Narratives in Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 900 (2009).
23
See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud:
Gatekeepers in State Court, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 467 (2011); Amanda M. Rose, The
Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010).
24
See, e.g., Daniel V. Dooley, Sr. & Mark Radke, Does Severe Punishment
Deter Financial Crimes?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 619, 622 (2010); Derick R. Vollrath,
Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing Regime in WhiteCollar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1004 (2010).
25
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 49, United States v. Madoff, 626 F.
Supp. 2d. 420 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2009) (No. 09 Crim. 213 (DC)).
26
Peter J. Henning, The Limits of Bigger Penalties in Fighting Financial
Crime, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) (Dec. 12, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/12/12/the-limits-of-bigger-penalties-in-fighting-financial-crime.
27
See, e.g., Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 397.
28
The most common line of criticism on this score takes issue with what is
taken to be an overly demanding standard of good faith, and an overly draconian set of
consequences if one is shown to have lacked good faith, including compelled return of
any money one withdrew from the scheme, whether as “profits” or principal. See, e.g.,
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1615-23.
29
See, e.g., Pozza, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 131 (“The current case-by-case
approach does not appear to yield fair uniform results. A new comprehensive approach
designed for overall victim fairness should be considered.”); Macchiarola, supra note 19,
Conclusion (text accompanying nn.67-68); Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1632.
30
Of particular note here is a concern that the trustee can use the threat of
protracted, costly litigation to leverage settlements from investors who may have been
wholly innocent of the fraud. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1629-30. Cf. Van Voris,
supra note 8 (quoting Wilpon and Katz’s complaint that the lawsuit against them is
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believed to produce among investors.31 But there has been no
sustained inquiry into the foundational normative question—
namely, whether innocent winning investors should be required
to help defray losing investors’ losses in the first place.32 This
article addresses that question and concludes that clawback
suits targeting blameless winners lack a compelling legal or
equitable basis.
The article first proceeds, in Part I, by offering some of
the factual and legal background to the Madoff case. In Part II,
I turn to the legislative history and statutory structure of the
Bankruptcy Code’s recovery provisions, and I argue that there
is only a weak doctrinal basis for the bankruptcy trustee’s
clawback efforts. Nonetheless, analogies to widely embraced
rules surrounding unjust enrichment and stolen goods provide
considerable intuitive support for the notion that Ponzi scheme
winners should return some of their gains to the scheme’s
losers. For example, where an individual gains as a result of a
wrong perpetrated against another—at that victim’s expense—
the individual may be compelled to return these ill-gotten
gains. Similarly, where an individual purchases an item
without knowledge that it is stolen, she must return the stolen
item to its original owner, even if that means the innocent
nothing more than “an outrageous strong-arm effort to try to force a settlement by
threatening to ruin our reputations and businesses” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31
Thus, for example, Karen Nelson argues that the clawback suits create infighting between the scheme’s investors, and encourage attorneys, in contravention of
legal ethics, to advise their Madoff-investing clients to secret away their assets. See
Karen E. Nelson, Note, Turning Winners into Losers: Ponzi Scheme Avoidance Law and
the Inequity of Clawbacks, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1456, 1473, 1457-58 (2011). Nelson also
argues that clawing back money from innocent investors “strays from America’s
fundamental tenets of capitalism.” Id. at 1458. I set this last concern aside because our
political and economic culture is replete with instances in which individuals or entities
help to defray losses that they have neither culpably caused, nor caused at all. Take,
for example, the September 11th compensation fund, or our progressive system of
taxation, for that matter. I go on to argue for a compensation program more expansive
than the one entailed by the clawback suits, on the thought that there is usually
nothing but luck that distinguishes those who profit from the stock market from those
who do not. Luck should not play so great a role in determining whether one ends up
on the losing end of a wrong. If capitalism cannot accommodate that thought, so much
the worse for capitalism.
Mallory Sullivan complains that the clawback suits are unfair because
they target investors who may have relied reasonably on the legitimacy of their
withdrawals, and so no longer have the money now sought to be clawed back. See
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1633-34. Reasonable reliance seems to be the rationale
underlying legislative proposals to limit, if not eliminate, clawback suits against
innocent Ponzi scheme investors. See id.
32
But cf. O’Keefe, supra note 8 (describing a pending GAO investigation into
Picard’s recovery efforts, including his clawback suits, in response to a letter from several
Congresspersons expressing concern about the trustee’s “punishing the Ponzi scheme
scammer’s victims by filing ‘clawback’ lawsuits”) (quoting Rep. Scott Garret (R-N.J.)).
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purchaser will forfeit the money she paid to the seller.
Pursuant to this reasoning, the Madoff bankruptcy trustee has
sought to defend the clawback actions by analogizing them to
cases seeking the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains or the return
of stolen goods. In Part III, I argue that these analogies are
mistaken, because the Madoff winners are neither the
beneficiaries of a windfall—as is typically true in cases of unjust
enrichment—nor the recipients of a unique, non-fungible good—
as is typically true in cases of stolen goods. In Part IV, I examine
other doctrines that appear to impose pecuniary penalties on
investors who innocently profit from corporate or financial
wrongdoing, but I argue that their apparent resemblance is
deceiving. These doctrines either extend only to investors who
are not wholly innocent of the wrongdoing, or they do not in fact
require the innocent investor to return money as a means of
offering restitution. Together, Parts II, III, and IV seek to
establish that we cannot find support for the Ponzi scheme
clawback actions in the bankruptcy code, or within other
equitable or legal doctrines. Nevertheless, rather than
abandoning the prospect of restitution altogether, I seek, in Part
V, to defend a restitutionary scheme that would have all those
who profit in the market defray the losses that fraudulent
schemes produce. In other words, I argue that “winning”
investors bear restitutionary obligations whether their profits
derive from a legitimate or fraudulent investment vehicle. I
thus end by urging a far more expansive restitutionary
program than clawback suits currently afford.
I.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Madoff scandal is a good place to begin an
investigation into Ponzi scheme clawback cases—not only
because it is the largest fraud in recorded history, but also
because it provides an entrée to the legal framework governing
clawback suits and the murky, ad hoc, and oftentimes flawed
judicial reasoning that these suits invite. In Part I.A, I provide
a brief overview of the relevant facts leading up to Madoff’s
arrest and the commencement of the recovery actions. Part I.B
engages critically with the Second Circuit opinion that set the
stage for the clawback suits by denying the Madoff winners’
claims to recover what they believed they were owed based on
their last investment account statements.
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History and Revelation of a Fraud

Madoff created Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities (BLMIS) in the early 1960s,33 originally functioning
as a market-maker and broker-dealer.34 Later, Madoff added an
investment advisory arm to the business, which Madoff used to
recruit investors for his eventual Ponzi scheme.35 Although
Madoff, in the course of his confession, reported that the Ponzi
scheme began in the early 1990s,36 one of his associates has
since revealed that the scheme in fact dated back to the early
1970s.37 It is not clear how much of Madoff’s business was
fraudulent in the period between the 1970s and the 1990s. But
we do know that beginning in the 1990s, Madoff did not buy or
sell a single share on behalf of his customers, despite sending
investors regular statements that reported market transactions
and indicated an average growth of 12 percent.38 Madoff
claimed that his consistent positive returns resulted from a
unique split-strike conversion strategy that he had pioneered.39
Because Madoff made no investments, customer
redemptions were funded with money that other customers had
deposited with him. Thus, when a customer sought to withdraw
money from her account in an amount listed on her most recent
statement, Madoff made up the difference between the amount
the customer had invested and the amount she sought to
withdraw with money other customers had “invested” with him.40
Importantly, many of those who withdrew more money
from their Madoff accounts than their principal investments
were genuinely in the dark about his fraud. For one thing, we
33

Complaint at 4, SEC v. Madoff, 2009 WL 980288 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009)
(No. 08-CV-10791).
34
See, e.g., Martin P. Randisi & Joseph Koletar, Holtz Rubenstein Reminick
LLP, A CAT Scan of the Madoff Scandal: Diagnosing Fraud Inside the Black Box, at 4,
available at http://www.hrcpa.com/Catscan.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
35
See, e.g., Plea Allocution of Bernard L. Madoff, at *2, *4, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/20090315madoffall.pdf (last visited
Sept. 24, 2012).
36
Id. at *2.
37
See Madoff Associate Says Fraud Went Back to ‘70s, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2011, at B4.
38
See Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and
the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 371-72 (2009). Rhee here
describes the difficulty that a typical investor would have faced in seeking to establish
that these returns were impossible.
39
“The split-strike conversion strategy supposedly involved buying a basket
of stocks listed on the Standard & Poor’s 100 Index and hedging through the use of
options.” In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 2011).
40
See Plea Allocution of Bernard L. Madoff, supra note 35, at *1.
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now know that Madoff was masterful when it came to hiding his
fraud. He maintained an aloof posture, often refusing a
prospective investor before “accepting” her business;41 his returns
were consistent but also relatively modest so as not to arouse
suspicion;42 and the purported split-strike conversion strategy
was a seemingly plausible vehicle for generating these steady,
yet unspectacular returns.43 Further, a securities investor has no
duty to inquire about his stockbroker, even if confronted with
suspicious circumstances.44 In any event, Madoff’s investors may
have had some cause for assurance. In particular, many of them
knew that the SEC had investigated Madoff and never
uncovered any financial wrongdoing.45 They may even have
reasonably relied on the fact that financial regulators believed
Madoff’s business to be clean.46 Indeed, if the SEC proved
incapable of detecting the fraud, it is not reasonable to suppose
that the average investor should have done so. Thus, we may
41

See, e.g., DAVID E.Y. SARNA, HISTORY OF GREED: FINANCIAL FRAUD FROM
TULIP MANIA TO BERNIE MADOFF, ch. 21 (2010); Robert Chew, A Madoff Whistle-Blower
Tells His Story, TIME (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/
0,8599,1877181,00.html (“Madoff’s greatest talent, the witness indicated, was his use of
a ‘hook’ or lure to play ‘hard to get’ and the false security of exclusivity, a hallmark of a
Ponzi scheme.”).
42
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1622-23.
43
See Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 31 (2009) (testimony of Harry Markopolos,
Chartered Financial Analyst, Certified Fraud Examiner) [hereinafter Hearings],
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48673/pdf/CHRG111hhrg48673.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). See generally Richard Posner, Bernard
Madoff and Ponzi Schemes—Posner’s Comment, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Dec. 21, 2008,
3:45
PM),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/12/bernard-madoff-and-ponzischemes--posners-comment.html (“The strategy . . . attributed to Madoff is the opposite
of that of the typical Ponzi schemer: it [wa]s to obtain investments from well-off people
far more financially sophisticated than the average Ponzi victim, including genuine
financial experts such as hedge fund managers and bank officials. And therefore it
require[d] different tactics from that of the ordinary Ponzi scheme, such as offering
returns only moderately above average, satisfying redemption requests promptly,
turning down some would-be investors . . . , and trading on a reputation earned in a
legitimate business (Madoff’s business of market making).”).
44
See, e.g., Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing In re
New Times Sec. Servs., 371 F.3d 68, 87 (2d Cir. 2004)). On the other hand, an investor
will undercut his claim to have proceeded in good faith if he has willfully blinded
himself to red flags. See id.
45
See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Lawyer Raised Madoff Concerns but
Was Rebuffed, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at B3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/jul/02/business/fi-sec-madoff2.
46
See, e.g., Herve Stolowy et al., Information, Trust and the Limits of
“Intelligent Accountability” in Investment Decision Making: Insights from the Madoff Case
15-17 (Sept. 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1930128 (collecting quotes from Madoff investors who stated
that they were reassured that the investment scheme was legitimate as a result of the
SEC’s failure to uncover any fraud).
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assume that many investors in Madoff’s scheme were blamelessly
ignorant of his wrongdoing.47 Many investors profited from the
fraud, but they did so innocently; they did not know, and had no
reason to know, that Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme.48
With markets crashing in the fall of 2008, an
unexpected number of Madoff customers sought to liquidate
their accounts. Because Madoff could not possibly satisfy all of
the claims, the scheme went bust.49 After Madoff confessed to
his family on December 10, 2008, his sons consulted with their
lawyer and tipped the police off to the fraud. Madoff was
arrested the next day.50 At the time, Madoff had 4800
customers with open accounts, who had invested a total of $20
billion in principal and accumulated an aggregate (fictitious)
sum of $65 billion, according to their last statements on
November 30, 2008.51 It was clear that Madoff did not have $20
billion in assets to return to his customers, let alone the $65
billion they thought they were owed.52 The company officially
went into bankruptcy on the day of Madoff’s arrest.53

47

See generally Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the
Sophisticated Investor,” 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 273 & n.305 (2010) (citing arguments
that regulations concerning who counts as a sophisticated investor are too broad as, for
example, where a high net wealth is sufficient to qualify the investor as “sophisticated”).
48
Picard acknowledges this when he states, on the webpage summarizing his
efforts, that “[s]ome BLMIS customers unwittingly withdrew funds that were, in
reality, money stolen by Madoff from other BLMIS customers.” A Message from SIPA
Trustee Irving H. Picard, MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://madoff.com/trusteemessage-24.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) (emphasis added).
49
See, e.g., David A. Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for
Ponzi Schemes, 34 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 189 (2010) (“With Madoff, the engine of
fraud churned on until the collapse of the securities markets caused new investors to
stop feeding the scheme and made it impossible for Madoff to continue.”).
50
See, e.g., The Madoff Case: A Timeline, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112966954231272304.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Diana
B. Henriques, New Description of Timing on Madoff’s Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009,
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/business/10madoff.html?_r=1;
Ellen S. Podgor, Madoff, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF. BLOG (Dec. 16, 2008),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2008/12/the-madoff-case.html
(listing a variety of media reports on the Madoff Ponzi scheme).
51
See, e.g., Allison Hoffman, Prosecutors Submit Scam E-mail with Madoff
Victim Letters, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 24, 2009, available at http://www.jpost.com/
International/Article.aspx?id=136942.
52
See, e.g., Linda Sandler, Madoff Brokerage, Homes, Boats Valued at $1
Billion (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2009, 11:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZP0jyjuTdTI.
53
See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC) (In re Madoff II), 429 B.R. 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d, 848 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard
L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC) (In re Madoff I), 424
B.R. 122, 124 & n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 654 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2011).
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Pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act
(SIPA), Irving Picard was appointed as a trustee to recover
money and redistribute it to creditors of the estate.54 SIPA
instructs the trustee “to distribute customer property
and . . . otherwise satisfy net equity claims,”55 and “to liquidate
the business of the debtor.”56 For the latter, the trustee must
proceed in accordance with the bankruptcy code under Title 11.57
In structuring his recovery efforts, the trustee has been
required to address two broad questions: first, who is entitled to
restitution, and second, who should provide restitution to those
entitled to it? The clawback suits against innocent investors
provide a partial response to the second question, and their
justifiability is the major focus of this article. Nonetheless, an
examination of the trustee’s response to the first question is also
useful, since it demonstrates the legal uncertainty in this area
and sets the stage for the clawback suits.
B.

Defining “Net Equity”

The Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) provides
that, in the event a broker-dealer fails and is unable to cover its
obligations, the trustee shall “distribute customer property and
otherwise satisfy net equity claims of customers.”58 Among the
first questions for Picard to resolve were who would count as a
customer entitled to “customer property,” and what net equity
these customers were due. In Madoff’s case, delineating the set
of customers was rather complicated. While some of those who
lost money as a result of Madoff’s fraud had invested directly
with Madoff, others had invested in Madoff “feeder funds.”
Sixteen feeder funds brought suit, seeking to have their status
as SIPA investors recognized. Judge Burton Lifland, the
bankruptcy judge handling the Madoff SIPA liquidation,
denied them relief and held that they do not count as
54

See, e.g., A Message from SIPA Trustee, Irving H. Picard, MADOFF
RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.madoff.com/trustee-message-02.html (last visited
Mar. 6, 2012). This is the trustee home page for the website the Madoff SIPA trustee
has established to report on the progress of the case and provide interested parties
with relevant information. On this page, Picard explains that “On the day the news [of
Madoff’s fraud] broke, I received a call from the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (‘SIPC’) and was asked to serve as SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (‘BLMIS’) under the Securities Investor
Protection Act (‘SIPA’).”
55
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(a)(1)(B) (2006).
56
Id. § 78fff(a)(4).
57
Id. § 78fff-4(e).
58
Id. § 78fff(a)(1)(B).
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“customers” under the SIPA statute.59 The feeder funds appealed,
but Judge Lifland’s decision was affirmed by the District Court
for the Southern District of New York in an opinion issued in
January of this year.60
When it came to determining the customers’ “net
equity”—i.e., the money they were entitled to recover—there
arose a “controversy of staggering proportions involving
statutory interpretation, statutory purpose, the relationship of
multiple SIPA and bankruptcy law provisions, and fundamental
bankruptcy law philosophy.”61 Using the “Last Statement”
method of calculating net equity, investors in Madoff’s scheme
asserted claims in the amounts listed on the last statements
they had received before the fund’s collapse.62 On the other hand,
relying on the “Net Investment” or “Cash-In-Cash-Out” method,
Picard, along with the SEC and SIPC, believed that the Madoff
investors should be entitled only to the amounts they had
deposited, minus any money withdrawn.63
In a March 1, 2010 opinion, Judge Lifland adopted the
“Net Investment” method: customers would be entitled to
recover only their principal, minus any withdrawals they had

59

See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. (In re Bernard
L. Madoff) (In re Madoff III), 454 B.R. 285 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom.
Aozora Bank Ltd. v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., No. 1:11-CV-05683-DLC, 2012 BL 54585
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012).
60
See generally Aozora Bank, 2012 BL 54585.
61
Paul Sinclair & Brendan McPherson, The Sad Tale of Multiple Overlapping
Fraudulent Transfers: Part IV, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2010, at 18.
62
See, e.g., In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir.
2011); Peter J. Henning, The Next Test for the Madoff Trustee, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK)
(Mar. 2, 2011, 8:50 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/the-next-test-for-themadoff-trustee/.
63
See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 233; Henning, supra
note 62. It may be worth noting in this context that SIPC pays Picard’s salary for the
Madoff litigation (though SIPC will recover the payments it makes to Picard through
whatever funds he is able to recoup). See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Many Holes
Weaken Safety Net for Victims of Failed Brokerages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2000, at A1,
A24. This arrangement can prompt the trustee in a SIPA proceeding, who likely wants
to become or remain a repeat player in this game, to be chary with claims and
aggressive with recovery efforts. Id. An uncharitable take on Picard would find
evidence for this motivation in his narrow reading of “net equity.” Cf. Paul Sinclair &
Brendan McPherson, Does SIPC Protect Customers in Ponzi Scheme Cases? Sad Tales
of Multiple Overlapping Fraudulent Transfers IV, 7 AM. BANKR. INST.: COMMERCIAL FRAUD
COMM. NEWS, Sept. 2010, at 267-68, available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/
newsletters/CFTF/vol7num3/sipc.pdf (commenting on the “net equity” decision in the
Madoff case, and contending that “[t]his SIPC controversy . . . is further infected by the
SIPC’s position as an industry body, rather than a governmental agency charged to
protect investors, and thus its alleged effort to simply reduce its losses to the most
limited amounts”).
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made over the life of their investments.64 The Second Circuit
affirmed this decision in an opinion issued on August 16,
2011,65 adducing three grounds in support of its decision.
Specifically, the court argued that allowing the net winners to
recover any of the money they believed resided in their
accounts would (1) place the trustee in the impossible position
of having to invent recovery entitlements, given that Madoff’s
records were completely fictitious and could not provide any
basis for ascertaining how much “profit” any investor was due;
(2) unjustly enrich the winners at the expense of the losers; and
(3) problematically legitimate Madoff’s fraud by recognizing
and upholding the fiction he had perpetrated. I address each of
these in turn, and I argue that none is convincing on its own or
in combination with the others.
1. Unascertainable Holdings
The court’s first set of arguments relates to
administrative convenience. The SIPA statute requires the
trustee “to make payments to customers based on ‘net equity’
insofar as the amount owed to the customer is ‘ascertainable
from the books and records of the debtor or [is] otherwise
established to the satisfaction of the trustee.’”66 Because
Madoff’s books and records were “after-the-fact constructs that
were based on stock movements that had already taken place,”
the Second Circuit found that net equity could not be
ascertained by reference to them.67 However, it is worth noting
that the plain text of the SIPA statute does not restrict net
equity calculations to those ascertainable from the debtors’
books and records, but instead explicitly allows alternative
methods that are “to the satisfaction of the trustee.”68
Elsewhere, the court acknowledged the considerable discretion
a SIPA trustee possesses in determining net equity,69 thereby
64

See In re Madoff I, 424 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 654 F.3d 229
(2d Cir. 2011).
65
See generally In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d 229. A group of
investors who would be ineligible for net equity under the decision filed an appeal with
the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari on June 25, 2012. See Velvel v. Picard, No.
11-986, 2012 WL 435188, at *1 (U.S. June 25, 2012); Ryan v. Picard, No. 11-969, 2012
WL 396489, at *1 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
66
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 237 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78fff-2(b) (2006)) (alteration in original).
67
Id. at 238.
68
15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b)(2).
69
“[I]n many circumstances a SIPA trustee may, and should, exercise some
discretion in determining what method, or combination of methods, will best measure
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refusing to endorse the Cash-In-Cash-Out method as the
strategy to be pursued in each and every case.70 Thus, it is
possible that an alternative to both the Last Statement and Net
Investment methods exists, that this alternative is preferable as
a matter of fairness to either of these methods, and that the
trustee would be acting within his authority were he to pursue
it.71 As the court itself acknowledged, it would be compelled to
“accord a degree of deference to [the trustee’s] exercise of
discretion so long as the method chosen by the trustee allocates
‘net equity’ among the competing claimants in a manner that is
not clearly inferior to other methods under consideration.”72
With that said, since the pool of accumulated funds
would be divided among a greater number of claimants, an
alternative definition of net equity that enlarges the set of
investors entitled to recovery would entail, all else being equal, a
smaller recovery for each. This would mean that investors who
had not recovered their principal at the time of the scheme’s
collapse would be made less whole under this alternative than
under the Cash-In-Cash-Out method—a problematic outcome if
one believes that all of the investors should be restored to their
pre-Madoff positions before any of them is entitled to profit from
the scheme. Indeed, this concern appears to animate the court’s
second and third lines of argument.

‘net equity.’” In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 238 n.7. Cf. Sullivan, supra
note 9, at 1600 (noting, in the context of a bankruptcy trustee’s efforts to recover money
for defrauded investors in a Ponzi scheme that “the court is given broad powers to rule on a
plan of distribution, subject only to the requirement that the court use its discretion in a
logical way to divide the money.” (citations omitted)); Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J.
Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the “Clawback” Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72
TEX. B.J. 922, 926 (2009) (“The trustee or receiver in a Ponzi scheme has a fair amount of
discretion in whether to pursue claims against investors and other transferees.”).
70
Thus the court made clear that its approach here was determined by the
unique circumstances of the case:
In holding that it was proper for Mr. Picard to reject the Last Statement Method,
we expressly do not hold that such a method of calculating “net equity” is
inherently impermissible. To the contrary, a customer’s last account statement
will likely be the most appropriate means of calculating “net equity” in more
conventional cases . . . . The extraordinary facts of this case make the Net
Investment Method appropriate, whereas in many instances, it would not be.
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 238.
71
For example, the trustee might have determined what each Madoff
investor would have been owed had Madoff invested all of the money he received in an
S&P 500 index for the duration of the investment; the trustee could then have taken
this sum as the basis for determining each investor’s pro rata share, with deductions
for money already withdrawn.
72
Id. at 238 n.7.

2012]

RIGHTING OTHERS’ WRONGS

17

2. Unjust Enrichment
In a second set of arguments, the court expressed
concern that crediting investors with any amount of “interest”
would leave less money in the pot with which to make losing
investors whole.73 As an initial matter, it is certainly true that
permitting principal plus some post hoc assignment of profits
as the basis of recovery—rather than principal alone—would
create a larger outstanding sum owed to investors, such that
each losing investor would receive less than under the Net
Investment method. But this outcome represents an
“inequitable consequence” only if we have reason to privilege
lost principal over lost (purported) earnings.
Under a legitimate investment, winning customers who
had not yet cashed out would be owed the amounts on their last
statements, even though they had already recovered the
amounts of their deposits and even if, because of the estate’s
insolvency, seeking to pay the winners their outstanding profits
would entail that losing customers would receive less than the
full amount of their deposits in return. In other words, where
there has been legitimate investment activity, bankruptcy law
does not require that each investor receive his out-of-pocket
investment amount before any investor can receive earnings on
top of that investment. Yet, in such a case, winning investors do
receive an “additional benefit at the expense of” losing
investors.74 The question then arises: If the disparity isn’t unfair
in the case of genuine investments, why does the fictitious
nature of the investments render it unfair? The court, in its
third argument, offers what appears to be a response.
3. Legitimating Fraud
In endorsing the trustee’s interpretation of net equity,
the court stated that the “[t]rustee properly declined to
calculate ‘net equity’ by reference to impossible transactions.
Indeed, if the [t]rustee had done otherwise, the whim of the
73

“The inequitable consequence of such a scheme would be that those who
had already withdrawn cash deriving from imaginary profits in excess of their initial
investment would derive additional benefit at the expense of those customers who had
not withdrawn funds before the fraud was exposed.” Id. at 238; see also id. at 235
(quoting approvingly from the bankruptcy court’s underlying opinion, in which Judge
Lifland argued that “[a]ny dollar paid to reimburse a fictitious profit is a dollar no
longer available to pay claims for money actually invested.” In re Madoff I, 424 B.R.
122, 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
74
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 238.
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defrauder would have controlled the process that is supposed to
unwind the fraud.”75 Part of the court’s concern arose from the
fact that the “profits” Madoff recorded “were arbitrarily and
unequally distributed among customers.”76 For instance, Madoff
accorded significantly higher returns to his preferred clientele;
the disparity in return rates had nothing to do with market
performance and everything to do with Madoff’s whims.
The court correctly agreed with the trustee in declining
to countenance this aspect of the fraud. As the bankruptcy
judge had stated—and the Second Circuit quoted approvingly—
the trustee rightly “refuse[d] to permit Madoff to arbitrarily
decide who wins and who loses.”77 This refusal correctly
impugns the Last Statement method, at least as it applies to
those whose account statements were whimsically inflated by
Madoff. But again, it does not compel the Net Investment
method. The trustee might instead have found an objective
measure to project the amount investors would have been owed
had Madoff invested their money in a legitimate vehicle. In this
way, he would not have had to rely on, let alone credit, the
disparate ways in which Madoff treated his investors.
Further, contrary to the suggestion of the bankruptcy
court and Second Circuit, there is no basis for the notion that
recognizing a recovery amount that allows interest on
investors’ deposits involves a kind of complicity in, or
affirmation of, the fraud.78 Indeed, one might wonder how
seeking to make all investors whole, or fulfilling their
“legitimate expectations,” legitimizes Madoff’s fraud, rather
than undercuts it. After all, in a Ponzi scheme, it is presumed
that the scheme’s operator intends to defraud or otherwise
hinder his investors’ ability to recover their investment.79 A
recovery program more expansive than Picard’s would then
thwart, rather than serve, this presumed intention.
In sum, the Last Statement method may well be flawed.
But it is not at all clear that the Net Investment method is more
justifiable, either as a matter of law or fairness. Indeed, the Net
75
76
77

Id. at 241.
Id. at 238.
Id. (quoting In re Madoff I, 424 B.R. at 140) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
78

See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 238; In re Madoff I, 424
B.R. at 136 (stating that the Net Investment method allowed Picard to “unwind[],
rather than legitimiz[e], the fraudulent scheme”).
79
See infra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the Ponzi scheme
presumption).
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Investment method generates fairness concerns that extend well
beyond the denial of the winners’ claims to any recovery.80
C.

Setting the Stage for the Clawback Actions

To grasp the implications of the net equity decision for
the clawback actions, it will be helpful to consider a hypothetical
Madoff investor. Suppose, for example, that investor Smith
opened an account with Madoff in 1980 with a one-time deposit
of $1 million, and that he withdrew money from his account only
once, in 2004, when he retrieved $2 million; then, on November
30, 2008, Smith received a statement from BLMIS indicating
that he had $8 million left in his Madoff account. How would
Smith fare in light of the net equity decision?
First, that decision allowed Madoff’s customers to be
divided into two groups—“winners” and “losers.” “Winners”
were those investors who had withdrawn more money from
their accounts than they had deposited. “Losers,” on the other
hand, still had some or all of their principal invested with
Madoff at the time of the fund’s collapse, and they would
sustain a net loss if that money were not returned to them.
Because the amount of Smith’s 2004 withdrawal ($2 million)
was greater than the amount of his total deposit ($1 million),
he would be counted among the Madoff “winners.”
Second, the decision entailed that only the Madoff “losers”
would count as “customers” for purposes of recovering net equity.
Net “winners,” on the other hand, would join the ranks of other
creditors of the estate, recovering the fictitious amounts they
thought they were owed only if the “losers” were first made
whole.81 Thus, even though Smith reasonably relied upon the
veracity of his BLMIS statements, including the last statement
indicating an $8 million balance in his Madoff account, he would
not be entitled to recover any more than $1 million under the
Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of net equity.
Third, the problem is not simply that “winners” with
open accounts would be barred from recovering any money as
customers of the estate. They might also be required to return
their “winnings”—i.e., all money withdrawn in excess of that
80

See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text (discussing the fairness
implications of the Net Investment method).
81
See, e.g., What Is the Difference Between the Customer Fund and the
General Estate?, MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.madoff.com/facts-08.html
(last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
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which they had invested. Thus, Smith could be subject to a
clawback action for the $1 million he withdrew in excess of his
$1 million investment. Indeed, we now know that many reallife “winners” in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, including some whom
Picard believes to have been innocently ignorant of the fraud,
have been named as defendants in his clawback suits.
Finally, if the bankruptcy trustee could establish that
Smith evinced a lack of good faith at the time that he received
the $2 million, matters would be even worse for Smith in light
of the bankruptcy code provision described below, which allows
the trustee to void a transfer if the transferee knew or had
reason to know of the fraud at the time of the transfer. In that
case, the trustee could seek return of not just the $1 million in
“profits” that Smith withdrew, but also the $1 million that
represented Smith’s principal. In other words, if it were shown
that Smith knew or had reason to know of the fraud, the entire
$2 million transfer could be voided, leaving Smith with a net
loss of one million real dollars.82 Here, too, there are real-world
examples, including the clawback suit Picard filed against the
owners of the New York Mets, whom he has accused of willful
ignorance, and against whom he sought return of both
principal and “profits.”83
Critically, the net equity decision did not, as a matter of
law or logic, compel the trustee’s clawback suits. One could
consistently hold both that Madoff investors with outstanding
account balances were not eligible to recover more money than
they had deposited and that those investors who had already
withdrawn more than they had deposited would nonetheless get
to keep the withdrawn “profits.” Put another way, the fact that
“winners” would not be entitled to recovery in the bankruptcy
proceedings need not have entailed that they would have an
additional obligation to return the “winnings” they received
before the bankruptcy. Thus, to return to our hypothetical
example, Smith could have been foreclosed from seeking to

82

In Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC, Judge Jed Rakoff dismissed the bankruptcy
trustee’s common law aiding and abetting claims against HSBC, which is accused of
having funneled investors to Madoff, in part on the basis of the doctrine of in pari
delicto, or “unclean hands.” 454 B.R. 25, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). That doctrine prevents one
wrongdoer from suing one of her fellow wrongdoers for damages arising from their shared
wrongdoing. Id. With the HSBC decision as support, it may be that investors accused of
bad faith will raise an in pari delicto defense. See Peter J. Henning, Madoff Trustee’s Job
Just Became Much Tougher, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) (July 29, 2011),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/madoff-trustees-job-just-became-much-tougher/.
83
See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 8.
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recover the $8 million he thought he had in his Madoff account
but permitted to keep the $2 million he had withdrawn.84
Nonetheless, as of December 10, 2010, Picard had filed
complaints against over one thousand investors seeking return
of their “fictitious profits,” and in some cases their withdrawn
principal,85 for a total possible recovery of more than $100
billion.86 I turn now to an analysis of the doctrinal foundations
for these suits.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE

The term “Ponzi scheme” dates back to the infamous
scheme perpetrated by Charles Ponzi in the early 1920s.87 Yet it
was only in the mid-1980s that bankruptcy trustees in Ponzi
scheme cases began to pursue clawback actions against
innocent investors who withdrew more than they had invested
in the scheme.88 The clawback suits rely upon a provision of the
84

One might worry that, given that the estate was bankrupt, there would
have been no money with which to make the losers whole unless Picard pursued
clawbacks against innocent winners. But as I describe infra, Picard ended up filing
clawback suits seeking a total of more than $100 billion, even though the outstanding
principle did not amount to more than $20 billion. See infra note 85 and accompanying
text. The $100 billion figure stemmed from claims of punitive damages in those cases
where the trustee alleged that the transferee had known of, or been willfully blind to,
the fraud, and so would not be permitted to keep either the principal or profits. See,
e.g., Complaint at ¶ 8, Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(seeking $19 billion, comprised of money the bank earned from Madoff’s account as well
as punitive damages). In short, there might well have been enough money to fund the
recovery even if the innocent winners were not made to contribute to the customer
fund. And, even if there wouldn’t have been enough money, it is not at all clear that
that outcome would be unfair to the losers—indeed, that is just the issue I seek to
settle here.
85
See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Picard Dealt Another Blow, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG
(Nov. 2, 2011, 11:34 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/02/picard-dealt-anotherblow-by-sdny/.
86
See, e.g., id.
87
See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924) (discussing the collapse
of Charles Ponzi’s fraudulent investment program); Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi
Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J.
157, 158 (1998). Ponzi was not the first to perpetrate the kind of fraud that now bears
his name. In 1880, for example, Ferdinand Ward orchestrated just this kind of fraud,
ensnaring, among others, Ulysses S. Grant. See generally GEOFFREY C. WARD, A
DISPOSITION TO BE RICH (2012) (a recounting of Ferdinand Ward’s fraud written by a
renowned historical writer, who happens to be the fraudster’s great-grandson).
88
A Westlaw search for all federal and state cases containing the terms
“Ponzi” and “fraudulent conveyance” or “fraudulent transfer” turns up 190 cases. Only
four of these arose before 1984. The first three stem from Charles Ponzi’s scheme itself,
and only one of these was successful. More specifically, in Engstrom v. Lowell, the
trustee lost because the law in question required the trustee to establish that the
defendant—i.e., the target of the clawback suit—had actual knowledge of the fraud,
and this the trustee failed to do. 281 F. 973, 976 (1st Cir. 1922). The trustee lost a
second case arising from Ponzi’s fraud on similar grounds. See Cunningham v. Merchs.’
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bankruptcy code that SIPA borrows from,89 allowing a SIPA
trustee to void (or, to use the technical term, “avoid”) any
transfer from the debtor’s estate that was conveyed
fraudulently.90 More specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 548 provides that
a bankruptcy trustee:
may avoid any transfer . . . if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily
(A) made such transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after
the date that such transfer was made . . . , indebted; or (B)(i)
received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer . . . ; and (ii) [the debtor was insolvent,
undercapitalized, or overextended at the time of the transfer, or he
became so as a result of the transfer].91

Subsection (A) of the provision pertains to cases of actual fraud,92
while subsection (B) pertains to cases of constructive fraud.93
Nat’l Bank of Manchester, N.H., 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925). In a 1924 opinion, the
Supreme Court did approve the trustee’s efforts to void the withdrawals investors in
Ponzi’s fraud made after the Boston Post exposed the fraud, Cunningham, 265 U.S. at
9-14, but the clawbacks in that case derived not from the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent
transfer provision—as Picard’s clawback suits do—but instead from its preference
avoidance provision. I elaborate on the distinction between these two provisions below.
See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. The next published opinion involving
clawbacks from investors in a Ponzi scheme was issued in a 1966 case where the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision allowing the bankruptcy trustee to
reclaim money received by an associate of the Ponzi schemer who was held to have had
reason to know, if not actual knowledge of the fraud. See Conroy v. Shott (In re Cohen),
363 F.2d 90, 92-93 (6th Cir. 1966). That case, thus, did not involve an innocent
investor. The first published case involving a successful avoidance action against an
innocent investor on fraudulent conveyance grounds was decided in 1989. See Wootton
v. Barge, 875 F.2d 508, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1989). Federal bankruptcy law was overhauled
in 1979, with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1979 replacing the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. See, e.g., Robert J. White, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Conveyance Laws
Under the Bankruptcy Code—Like Oil and Water, They Just Don’t Mix, 1991 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 357, 358 (1991). Nonetheless, fraudulent conveyances provisions can be
found in both Acts, see id., and Ponzi scheme cases date back to the 1920s, so the
upswing in Ponzi scheme clawback cases cannot be attributed to the statutory change.
89
See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-4(e) (2006).
90
Excellent overviews of the doctrine governing clawbacks in the wake of a
Ponzi scheme can be found in Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of
Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 223-25 (1998); see also
Tally M. Wiener, On the Clawbacks in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding, 15 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 221, 223 n.7 (2009).
91
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
92
Courts proceed as if there is a presumption of actual fraud in every Ponzi
scheme case, since there will never be enough money in the scheme to provide all
investors with a return of their principal along with the promised returns, and “since a
failure to redeem in accordance with the investor’s expectation based on inflated
account statements would . . . result[] in the investigation and discovery of the fraud.”
Barasch & Chesnut, supra note 69, at 926 (citing In re Bayou Grp., 396 B.R. 810, 843
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)). See, e.g., SEC v. Res. Dev. Int’l, 487 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In
this circuit, proving that IERC (International Education Research Corporation)
operated as a Ponzi scheme establishes the fraudulent intent behind the transfers it

2012]

RIGHTING OTHERS’ WRONGS

23

On its face, the text of this provision permits two
different interpretations of the provision’s rationale. According
to the first, the purpose of the fraudulent transfer provision is
to prevent the debtor from secreting away his assets, typically
for his own benefit, such that they are beyond the reach of his
creditors. I refer to this as the anti-fraud reading (AF) of § 548.
According to the second, the even distribution reading (ED), the
purpose of the fraudulent transfer provision is to ensure the
most even distribution of assets as possible by conferring upon
each creditor his pro-rata share of the recovered resources.94

made.” (citation omitted)); In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 397 B.R. 1, 8 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (“There is a general rule—known as the ‘Ponzi scheme presumption’—that such
a scheme demonstrates ‘actual intent’ as matter of law because ‘transfers made in the
course of a Ponzi scheme could have been made for no purpose other than to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors.’” (citation omitted)). See generally McDermott, supra note
87, at 173-74 & n.66 (collecting cases). Nonetheless, a lawyer representing a defendant
in a clawback suit might want to argue that the presumption is unwarranted. The
actual fraud provision refers not to the Ponzi scheme operator’s global or over-arching
intention with respect to the scheme, but rather to the operator’s intentions relative to
the transfers that are the subject of the clawback suit. It may be that the operator had
no intention to defraud anyone when he made those transfers. Indeed, this would seem
to be especially true for those transfers made early in the scheme, when the operator
might well have believed that the scheme was a temporary measure, and that
subsequent legitimate investments would allow him to recover the money that he had
diverted from one investor to another, thereby restoring the investor whose investment
had been diverted.
93
It is worth noting that there is a disagreement among courts as to whether
the investor’s deposits constitute “reasonably equivalent value” for any profits she
receives over and above the amount deposited. See, e.g., McDermott, supra note 90, at
164-65 & n.36 (collecting cases). Judge Posner has argued that the fictitious profits
should be subject to clawback even if one grants that the investor’s principal
constituted fair consideration:
We said that [the clawback target’s] profit was supported by consideration. But
what was the source of the profit? A theft by [the Ponzi scheme operator] from
other investors. What then is [the clawback target’s] moral claim to keep his
profit? None, even if the intent in paying him his profit was not fraudulent.
Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1995). Posner’s argument begs the
question insofar as it privileges the “theft” that the scheme perpetrates against the
losing investor over the fraud that the scheme perpetrates against the winning
investor: Suppose that the debtor genuinely owed W money, and that the debtor could
obtain the money owed only by stealing from L, and so the debtor proceeded to steal from
L. We would think that W was required to return the money to L only if we discounted
W’s claim to the money. But why should the debtor’s obligation to give money to W count
for less than L’s entitlement to the stolen money? To be sure, the situation looks like the
classic case of stolen goods, where the bona fide recipient must return the stolen good
even if she had no reason to know it was stolen when she acquired it; Posner’s rhetoric—
referring to the Ponzi scheme as a theft—certainly underscores the force of the analogy.
Nonetheless, I go on to discuss both the ways in which the law of stolen goods is both
inapposite and inadequately justified. See infra Part III.B.
94
Robert Clark uses the term “evenhandedness” to refer to one of the
objectives of the avoidance provisions in bankruptcy law. Robert Charles Clark, The
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 511-12 (1977). As
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Put differently, AF attends to the value of the estate, while ED
attends to its distribution among creditors. In this Part, I argue
that Picard’s clawback actions find support only in the ED
reading of § 548, but that the history and text of § 548 strongly
favor the AF reading.
A.

The Even Distribution (ED) Reading

One could argue that the letter of the law is compatible
with the ED reading and therefore supports the clawback
actions. For example, subsection (B) under § 548, which is
intended to cover instances of constructive fraud, allows for
avoidance of a transfer “if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily . . . (i) received less than a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for such transfer,” and (ii) the debtor was
insolvent, undercapitalized, or overextended at the time of the
transfer, or he became so as a result of the transfer.95 In
defending the propriety of the Madoff clawback suits against
this provision, one could contend that any “profits” that a
Madoff customer withdrew were profits for which the fund
received less than a “reasonably equivalent value.” This money
exceeds the amount the customer had invested. Further, since
Madoff had promised customers returns that he could not
possibly produce—again, he hadn’t invested their deposits at
all, so there was no way for the deposits to appreciate in
value—he was necessarily insolvent at the time of any
customer’s withdrawal. Thus, the winners’ “winnings” appear
to satisfy § 548’s criteria for a constructively fraudulent
transfer and accordingly appear subject to avoidance.
The problem with this reasoning is that the clawback
actions deviate from the spirit of the fraudulent transfer
provision. More specifically, if we look at the history of the
fraudulent transfer provision, as well as other elements of the
statutory scheme, it becomes clear that the intent of the
fraudulent transfer provision is not to recoup money from
transferees like the Madoff “winners.”

he explains, “the ideal of Evenhandedness toward creditors . . . connot[es] . . . equality
of treatment of legal obligations in connection with liquidation proceedings.” Id.
95
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).
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The Anti-Fraud (AF) Reading

The bankruptcy code’s fraudulent transfer provision has
its genesis in the 1571 Statute of Elizabeth,96 which is virtually
identical in its language to subsection (A) of the current
fraudulent transfer provision. That 1571 law provided that
creditors may avoid “fraudulent . . . Conveyaunces,” which were
made with the “Intent to delaye[,] hynder[,] or defraude
Creditors . . . .”97 By comparison, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) provides:
“The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . if the debtor voluntarily
or involuntarily—(A) made such transfer . . . with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was
or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, indebted . . . .”98
The basic idea behind the Statute of Elizabeth was to
counteract certain kinds of mischief. For example, at the time,
there were certain sanctuaries into which the king’s writ could
not enter. As a result, debtors would take refuge in these
sanctuaries, but before doing so, they would sell their assets to
friends and family members for a nominal sum in order to
prevent creditors from reaching them. Then, when their
creditors finally gave up or the statute of limitations expired,
the debtor would buy back the assets from his friends and
family and, presumably, live happily ever after.99 To prevent
this practice, the Statute of Elizabeth was passed. For example,
under the statute, if the debtor sold his flock of sheep for a
pittance, creditors could avoid the transfer and undo it, thereby
returning the sheep to the estate so that creditors could access
their value.100
The untoward act that the Statute of Elizabeth
contemplated was not one where the debtor gives money to
creditor A and thereby leaves less in the pot for creditor B. It
was instead the situation in which the debtor seeks to frustrate
recovery on the part of all of his creditors, by transferring title
of his assets to another with the express purpose of reclaiming
them once the debtor was beyond the reach of his creditors. In
other words, the Statute of Elizabeth did not seek an even
96

See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law
and its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 829-30 (1985).
97
13 Eliz. I, ch. 5 (1571) (Eng.), DURHAM UNIV. (UK), available at
http://familyrecords.dur.ac.uk/nei/NEI_13Elizabeth1c5.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
98
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
99
See Baird & Jackson, supra note 96, at 829.
100
The example is Baird and Jackson’s. See id. at 852.
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distribution among all creditors. It merely sought to prevent
situations where the debtor attempted to safeguard assets for
his own enjoyment of them.
The rationale behind the Statute of Elizabeth is
enshrined in current law, as can be gleaned from various
elements in today’s bankruptcy code. Consider, for example,
the provision permitting avoidance of a transfer just so long as
it was made with fraudulent intent.101 If the objective of the
fraudulent transfer provision were to ensure an even
distribution among creditors, it would make no sense to permit
avoidance only where the debtor transferred assets with an
actual or constructive fraudulent intent. For example, suppose
that the year before our “Elizabethan deadbeat”102 became
insolvent,103 he gave his flock of sheep to his doctor in exchange
for medical services rendered, with no expectation of having
the sheep returned. The transfer would not be fraudulent, and
yet the value of the estate would be diminished to the same
extent as in the case where the debtor has given his brother the
flock of sheep for the sake of putting them out of his creditors’
reach. If we really were concerned about ensuring that all
creditors share equally in the losses, we would require the
doctor to return the sheep and line up with the other creditors
for his pro rata share of the estate. Allowing the doctor to
retain the sheep simply because they were not conveyed with a
fraudulent intent suggests that we are not concerned with
ensuring an even distribution.104
A second piece of evidence supporting the AF reading
over the ED reading emerges from a provision in the
bankruptcy code that allows the target of a clawback action to
marshal a good faith defense. In particular, 11 U.S.C. § 548(c)
provides that “a transferee . . . that takes for value and in good
101

11 U.S.C. § 548(a).
Baird & Jackson, supra note 96, at 852.
103
The hypothetical has the transfer occur a year before insolvency so that the
transfer of the sheep cannot be avoided as a form of preference avoidance, the reach
back period for which is less than one year.
104
One might argue that the doctor is entitled to keep his sheep not because
they were conveyed without fraudulent intent but because he qualifies for the
“ordinary course of business” defense, as captured in contemporary law by 11 U.S.C.
§ 547. But this is just to beg the question, for why should paying for medical services
count as part of the fraudster’s “ordinary” business while returning money to investors
does not? A purported distinction between the two seems to rest on the intuition that
the doctor has provided a legitimate service to the fraudster; but the investors had no
less reason than the doctor to believe that the transaction in which they engaged with
the fraudster was legitimate. So, again, the question of the grounds for the disparity in
treatment arises.
102
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faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred . . . to
the extent that such transferee . . . gave value to the debtor in
exchange for such transfer . . . .”105 Thus, for example, consider a
Ponzi scheme with two customers—Smith and Jones. Smith
and Jones both invest the same amount of money at the same
time. Neither has any idea that they are investing in a Ponzi
scheme, nor are there any red flags that should have put them
on notice. Six months before the Ponzi scheme is exposed,
Smith withdraws an amount equal to his principal. Because
Smith will have taken “for value and in good faith,” he will get
to keep 100 percent of the money he has withdrawn. If the
Ponzi scheme operator is completely insolvent at the time the
scheme collapses, Jones will end up with nothing. Again, in the
case between Smith and Jones, if the purpose of § 548 were to
ensure an even distribution between creditors, the fact that
Smith had taken in good faith would be irrelevant. Smith
would instead be required to give back 50 percent of the money
he had withdrawn in order to offset Jones’s losses. The law,
instead, provides that Smith gets to keep the full amount of his
withdrawal, and Jones gets nothing.106
Moreover, the distinction between “net winners” and
“net losers” lends further support to the AF reading. Where an
investor has received no more than the amount she deposited, a
court could consider her withdrawals to represent (fictitious)
interest payments, rather than return of principal, in which
case the money withdrawn would not have been offset by the
“reasonably equivalent value” that § 548(a)(1)(B) requires. This
would be an especially plausible way to proceed where the
Ponzi scheme operator specifically designated the withdrawals
105

11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (emphasis added).
In recent years, courts have narrowed the scope of the good faith defense,
adopting a demanding objective standard. See, e.g., In re Bayou Grp., 439 B.R. 284, 31012 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing the relevant test thusly: “The first question . . . is whether
the transferee had information that put it on inquiry notice that the transferor was
insolvent or that the transfer might be made with a fraudulent purpose . . . these two
elements are consistently identified as the triggers for inquiry notice . . . . Once a
transferee has been put on inquiry notice of either the transferor’s possible insolvency or
of the possibly fraudulent purpose of the transfer, the transferee must satisfy a ‘diligent
investigation’ requirement . . . . The test is most commonly phrased . . . as whether
‘diligent inquiry would have discovered the fraudulent purpose’ of the transfer.”).
106

Some commentators suggest that the narrow reading of the good faith defense is
an intentional effort by courts to reach all payments, not just profits, so that
early and late investors are at parity. This view is also shared by some judges,
who view the narrow reading as judicial activism . . . .
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1618 (citations omitted).
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as payments of interest, rather than return of principal.
Nevertheless, courts tend to credit payments first toward
principal and then, only after the amount deposited has been
fully withdrawn, toward interest. Thus one court stated that
“[i]f a given defendant received less than his [investment], the
amounts received should be considered return of principal,
regardless of how the parties may have designated them.”107 It
is this treatment that allows us to consider the person who
withdrew some money from her account—but less than she had
invested—to be a net loser, rather than an investor who earned
some profits from the Ponzi scheme. Yet again, if courts sought
to achieve an even distribution among customers, it would
make little sense to credit all payments up to the amount of the
deposit as principal. This approach puts those payments
beyond the bankruptcy trustee’s reach—because the investor
has given reasonably equivalent value for these withdrawals
under § 548(B)(i)—thereby leaving less money in the pot for
redistribution. The fact that the doctrinal understanding of
constructive fraud allows an innocent investor to keep the full
amount of her principal again suggests that it does not seek an
even distribution in the first instance.
A final argument against the ED reading is evident
from the fact that the bankruptcy code contains a separate
provision that straightforwardly seeks to accomplish the goal of
even distribution among creditors. The preference avoidance
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 547 state that “the trustee may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property” made “on
or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition.”
The underlying idea is that a debtor should not be permitted to
play favorites in determining which creditors should have their
debts repaid.108 Instead, all creditors of the same class should
receive a distribution of the estate proportionate to what they
are owed. Section 547 thus negates preferences among
creditors and, in so doing, ensures an equitable distribution
among them. Indeed, as one of the foremost treatises on
107

Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 852 n.14
(D. Utah 1987).
108
For a classic case that seems to involve a transfer that was both fraudulent
and preferential, see Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 810-13 (Star Chamber 1601).
There, the debtor owed debts to both Twyne and C. but did not have sufficient assets to
cover both debts. He secretly gifted the assets he possessed to Twyne, who allowed the
debtor to continue using the assets in question. This transaction reflected both an
unfair preference for Twyne and a fraudulent conveyance, insofar as it was conducted
in secret with the intention of hindering C.’s recovery.
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bankruptcy law explains, “preference law . . . restructures
transactions so as to level out the overall treatment received by
similar creditors.”109 If the purpose of § 547 is to ensure an even
distribution, it could not be the purpose of § 548, the fraudulent
transfer provision, to do so as well.110 Leveraging the fraudulent
transfer provision for purposes of seeking equity among
109

4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 66:1 (3d ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
110
But see In re Bayou Grp., 396 B.R. 810, 827 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284, 303, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Section 548 serves the
same policy function as Section 547, which allows the trustee to avoid preferential
payments made within ninety days of the bankruptcy to perfectly innocent creditors
who were legally entitled to be paid. Both sections represent an equitable
determination by Congress that under limited circumstances creditors must share
equally in the insolvency, or, in the case of Section 548, the fraud. Section 548 is not a
punitive provision designed to punish the transferee, but is instead an equitable
provision that places the transferee in the same position as other similarly situated
creditors who did not receive fraudulent conveyances.”). Commentators have decried
the Bayou decision, because it articulates an overly demanding test for establishing
good faith. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1623 (“[Bayou’s] objective good faith
standard contravenes congressional intent, confuses the goals of fraudulent and
preferential transfer law, unfairly penalizes savvier investors with actual good faith
based on their status alone, demands investors to be more diligent than the SEC itself,
and assumes (with the benefit of hindsight) that investors saw the ‘red flags.’”). Thus,
two other opinions from the Southern District of New York—Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R.
447, 453-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Rakoff, J.), the Madoff trustee’s billion-dollar fraudulenttransfer suit against the Mets’ owners, and Gowan v. The Patriot Grp. (In re Dreier
LLP), 452 B.R. 391 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Glenn, J.)—have explicitly disagreed with,
and so declined to follow, Bayou’s determination of the meaning of “good faith.” See
generally Paul D. Sinclair & Monika Machen, Katz, Dreier Cut into Aggressive
Trustees’ Positions, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2012, at 48.
More relevant here, the Bayou court’s assertion that both § 547 and § 548
have equity as their rationale is problematic for two reasons. First, if it were true, it
would render mysterious the different reach-back periods in §§ 547 (ninety days) and
548 (two years); surely the fact of the bankrupt’s wrong cannot justify exposing his
transferees to a longer reach-back period, which is to say exposing them to an
obligation to share more in the losses. Second, if the court is correct as to the rationale
for § 548, then its application to Ponzi scheme winners would undercut the reading of
“net equity” advanced by the SEC, adopted by Judge Lifland and affirmed by the
Second Circuit, see supra Part I.B. The Bayou court intends that “the transferee [be
placed] in the same position as other similarly situated creditors who did not receive
fraudulent conveyances.” In re Bayou Grp., 396 B.R. at 827. As applied to the Madoff
winners and losers, then, the winners should have no more entitlement, but also no
less, to Madoff’s estate. This would be the result if, say, all Madoff investors returned
all of the money they had withdrawn from their Madoff accounts, and it was then
divided among them in proportion to the amount of their investment. But the effect of
the net equity decision is to deny winners the status of customers with valid net equity
claims; at the same time, winners who can establish their good faith will have only
their withdrawn profits clawed back. So, winners who cannot establish their good faith
will come out behind the Madoff losers, while winners who proceeded in good faith will
come out ahead. And, there is no mechanism for excluding from recovery those losers
who did know of the fraud and, perhaps out of an excess of greed, chose to continue
riding the Ponzi scheme wave thinking that they could get out before the scheme
collapsed. In short, if the avoidance provisions really do seek an equitable distribution
of the bankrupt’s assets, then the law in this area is in even more disarray than the
text accompanying this note suggests.
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Madoff’s customers, then, renders the preference avoidance
provisions superfluous.111 Or, put less charitably, it is possible
to see Picard’s efforts to use the fraudulent transfer provision
to pursue clawbacks as an end-run around the shorter reachback period of a mere ninety days in the preference avoidance
provision,112 in favor of the longer reach-back period of up to six
years in the fraudulent transfer provision.113
111

But cf. Clark, supra note 94, at 510-13. Clark describes the general
rationale for both fraudulent conveyance and preference avoidance as “that of
Nonhindrance of the enforcement of valid legal obligations against oneself, in
connection with transfers of one’s property. In summary, then, fraudulent conveyance
law embodies a general ideal, in connection with a debtor’s transfers of property rights
and incurrences of new obligations, of Nonhindrance of creditors.” In this way, Clark
would seem to interpret both §§ 547 and 548 along the lines of what I have called the
AF reading. Nonetheless, Clark subsequently acknowledges that the ideal of
Evenhandedness, which underpins preference avoidance, is indeed distinct from the
other specifications of the general commitment to Nonhindrance:
It is also possible, however, to view Evenhandedness as a policy independent of,
and on a par with, a general ideal of Nonhindrance, and this aspect of the policy
has led to its development as a separate topic. While like the other two ideals
Evenhandedness specifies the moral duties of a debtor to his creditor,
Evenhandedness is also the ideal behind what is referred to as the law of
voidable preferences and many cases assume or state explicitly that a preference
is not a fraudulent conveyance.
Id. at 513.
112

11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). At least one court has decried § 547’s short statute
of limitations when it comes to Ponzi schemes:
For a Ponzi scheme that lasts more than three months, the statute[] . . . does not
go far enough. By definition, an enterprise engaged in a Ponzi scheme is
insolvent from day one. Thus, all transfers to investors in a Ponzi scheme are
preferential, not just those made within the three months before bankruptcy.
Every transfer prefers the transferee to those investors at the end of the line.
The evil of a preferential transfer is that it “unfairly permit[s] a particular
creditor to be treated more favorably than other creditors of the same class.” All
investors in a Ponzi scheme are creditors of the same class, so in theory all
should be treated equally. In effect, though, applying section 547 to a Ponzi
scheme . . . favors some creditors over others. Under section 547 the creditors
who are most preferred are allowed to keep their preferential payments because
the transfers were made outside the statutory period . . . . The statute simply
does not reach the early investors. Thus, applying the statute as written, the
court is “compelled to take part in a farce whose result is . . . to take away from
those who have little, the little that they have.” The equitable solution would be
either to apply the statute to all transfers to investors in a Ponzi scheme—
without regard to when the transfers were made—or to apply the statute to none
of the transfers.
In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah 1987) (citations omitted).
Other commentators have noted that the short reach-back period of the
preference avoidance provision might have impelled courts to adopt expansive
understandings of the circumstances under which a fraudulent transfer has arisen.
See, e.g., Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 404 (“[B]ecause the typical losing investor
nonetheless remains at an unfair disadvantage, courts have sought to rectify the
balance . . . . [C]ourts have begun to adopt a narrower reading of the good faith defense
so as to potentially reach all payments received by an investor from the scheme . . . not
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All of this shows that the AF reading is on far firmer
ground than is the ED reading. Treatise writers and
distinguished jurists seem to agree. Thus, one of the classic
bankruptcy law treatises states that “the intent of [fraudulent
conveyance statutes] . . . is not to provide equal distribution of
the estates of debtors among their creditors; there are other
statutes [in bankruptcy] which have that effect.”114 A leading
bankruptcy law casebook states that the “purpose of fraudulent
conveyance law, whatever its form, is simple: it protects a
debtor’s unsecured creditors from reductions in the debtor’s

just . . . fictitious profits.” (citation omitted)). At least some of these commentators
welcome this expansive reading. See id. Those who have decried the expansion do so on
separation of powers grounds, and not on the fairness-based grounds I adduce here. See,
e.g., Lustig v. Weisz (In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc.), 260 B.R. 343, 349-50
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001) aff’d sub nom. In re Unified Commercial Capital, No. 01-MBK6004L, 2002 WL 32500567 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002); Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1634-35.
[Some c]ourts . . . appear to believe that a “just” solution to the losses suffered by
the innocent investors in a “Ponzi” scheme requires some reallocation of the risks
and redistribution of the losses beyond that provided for by Congress in Section
547(b) . . . . [T]he fraudulent conveyance statutes cannot and should not be
utilized by courts as a super preference statute to effect a further reallocation
and redistribution that should be specifically provided for in a statute enacted by
Congress. The Section 548(a) and state law fraudulent conveyance statutes
implement a policy of preventing the diminution of a debtor’s estate. The Section
547(b) preference statute implements a principal policy of equality of
distribution. By forcing the square peg facts of a “Ponzi” scheme into the round
holes of the fraudulent conveyance statutes in order to accomplish a further
reallocation and redistribution to implement a policy of equality of distribution
in the name of equity, I believe that many courts have done a substantial
injustice to those statutes and have made policy decisions that should be made
by Congress.
In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc., 260 B.R. at 349-50.
113
Section 548 authorizes avoidance of transfers made only in the two years
prior to the declaration of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 548. However, § 544(b) of the Code
allows the trustee to avoid fraudulent conveyances based on state law, id. § 544(b), and
the New York fraudulent transfer provision allows for a six year reach-back period, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 2012). In the case against the Mets owners, Judge Rakoff held
that the bankruptcy trustee could proceed against the defendants only upon a theory of
actual fraud, as articulated in 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), which limited the reach back
period to two years (and the recovery amount to $384 million, rather than the $1 billion
the trustee had sought). See Katz, 462 B.R. at 451. It is not yet clear what effect, if any,
this ruling will have on the other Madoff claw back suits and, in particular, on the
allowable reach-back period.
114
1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 289
(rev. ed. 1940) (quoting In re Johnson, 20 Del. Ch. 389 (1881)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Peter L. Borowitz & Richard F. Hahn, The Troubled Leveraged
Buyout: Risks (and Opportunities) Under Fraudulent Conveyance and Other Creditors’
Rights Laws, in 694 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 51, 53-54 (“In its original form fraudulent conveyance law
focused exclusively on transfers of a debtor’s property where there was actual evidence
of the debtor’s intent to harm its creditors by hiding assets from imminent levy.”).
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estate to which they look, generally, for their security.”115 In a
First Circuit Court of Appeals decision, then-Judge Stephen
Breyer stated that one of the “basic functions” of fraudulent
conveyance law is “to see that an insolvent debtor’s limited
funds are used to pay some worthy creditor,” and not to
“determin[e] which creditor is the more worthy.”116 Breyer’s
conception has subsequently been endorsed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals,117 as well as numerous federal district
and bankruptcy courts.118 In short, according to all of these
sources, contemporary law allows fraudulent conveyances to be
avoided because they are fraudulent, not because they risk
creating a disparity between creditors of the same class.
But even if the bankruptcy code was not intended to be
used to take money from some innocent Ponzi scheme investors
and provide it to others, perhaps we should nonetheless refrain
from opposing the clawback actions. After all, any money that a
Madoff customer withdrew over and above that which she
invested was money that another Madoff customer had
deposited. In many cases, sheer luck will have allowed some
Madoff investors to come out ahead, while others come out with
little or nothing. Why should luck be so decisive, especially if the
winners’ “winnings” come directly from the losers’ pockets?
Indeed, Picard has relied on precisely this logic in defending the
clawback suits to the general public. Yet despite its intuitive
appeal, this rationale turns out to be quite problematic.
III.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND STOLEN GOODS

In seeking to justify avoidance actions filed against
innocent and (allegedly) knowing investors alike, Picard has
been quite savvy in his choice of language. In a quote to the
Wall Street Journal, Picard exclaimed that “the people who
made money, who got more, have made money at the expense
115

MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 387 (3d ed. 2006).
116
Boston Trading Grp. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1511 (1st Cir. 1987); see
also id. at 1509 (“[T]he basic object of fraudulent conveyance law is to see that the
debtor uses his limited assets to satisfy some of his creditors; it normally does not try to
choose among them.”).
117
See, e.g., Sharp Int’l Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Sharp Int’l
Corp.), 403 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir. 2005); HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 634
(2d Cir. 1995).
118
See, e.g., In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Grp., 956 F.2d 479, 484 (4th Cir.
1992); Kapila v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Pearlman), 460 B.R. 306, 312, (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2011); Walker v. Pasteur (In re Aphton Corp.), 423 B.R. 76, 93 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
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of the people who didn’t.”119 Putting the point even more starkly,
he subsequently described the disparity between winners and
losers by stating that, “for more than 20 years, Bernard Madoff
stole money from some people and gave it to others.”120 Echoing
this rhetoric, Picard’s lieutenant, David Sheehan, stated that
“[t]hose who didn’t get their money back are entitled to get it
from those who have it.”121
These statements have great intuitive appeal, as they
rely upon an implicit analogy to two well-established doctrines—
namely, the law of unjust enrichment and the law of stolen
goods. For both of these doctrines, one party may be compelled to
return money or goods illicitly taken from their original owner,
even if the former is completely innocent of the illicit taking.
Picard and Sheehan’s rhetoric implies that we should conceive of
the winners as the innocent recipients of ill-gotten gains or
stolen goods, in which case compelling the winners to return
their “winnings” to the losers would be consistent with the
doctrines governing unjust enrichment and stolen goods.
Picard is not alone in seeking to leverage this rhetoric.
Both the Securities Investor Protection Corporation and the
trustees charged with recovering assets in the wake of other
Ponzi schemes have also sought to support clawback suits by
analogizing the transfers they seek to avoid to instances of
unjust enrichment or stolen goods.122 It behooves us, then, to
119

Michael Rothfeld, Madoff Investors Brace for Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July
26,
2010,
at
C1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704719104575389141620473502.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
120
THE MADOFF RECOVERY EFFORT: AN UPDATE CALL WITH THE TRUSTEE AND
HIS COUNSEL FROM BAKER HOSTETLER, at 1, (Mar. 8, 2011, 3:00 PM), available at
http://207.58.180.20/document/news/000018-2011-march-8-picard-sheehan-openingstatements-for-march-8-press-call.pdf; see also Alan Rappeport, 123 Claims Filed over
Madoff Payouts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at 25, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
0aa84be4-fcdf-11df-ae2d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1os4RzPPa (quoting from the complaint
for the clawback suit filed against a hedge fund operator in which Picard alleges that
“[t]he transfers received by the defendant constitute non-existent profits supposedly
earned in the account, but, in reality, they were other people’s money . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
121
Madoff Recovery, supra note 120, at 6. Joe Nocera, the New York Times
columnist, echoes these words in his arguments supporting the clawback suits: “[T]he
net winners’ gains came from the pockets of the net losers. That’s how a Ponzi scheme
works. If you buy a stolen watch, and its real owner wants it back, don’t you have an
obligation to return it?” Joe Nocera, Suspense Is Over in Madoff Case, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2012, at A23.
122
Thus, the receiver appointed by the SEC in the Stanford International
Bank fraud has sought to recover money from innocent beneficiaries of the Ponzi
scheme by advancing, inter alia, a claim that they were unjustly enriched. Receiver’s
First Amended Complaint Against Certain Stanford Investors ¶¶ 39-42, Janvey v.
Alguire, 846 F. Supp. 2d 662 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 03:09-CV-0724-N), available at
http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com/documents/Receivers_First_Amended_
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consider the force of the analogies. In this Part, I address each
of the purportedly analogous doctrines in turn.
A.

The Law of Unjust Enrichment

The law of unjust enrichment holds that “[a] person has
a right to have restored to him a benefit gained at his expense
by another, if the retention of the benefit by the other would be
unjust.”123 An unjust enrichment analysis includes the following
inquiries: “(i) Was the defendant enriched? (ii) Was it at the
expense of [the] claimant? (iii) Was it unjust?”124 An affirmative
answer to each of these questions entails that a defendant has
been unjustly enriched. Such a defendant will be required to
restitute the plaintiff, unless the defendant can marshal an
established defense.125
A recitation of the bare elements of the doctrine of
unjust enrichment cannot tell us whether the Madoff winners
were in fact unjustly enriched. For one thing, whether the
winners’ profits were accrued at the expense of the losers turns
on whether the losers maintain a claim to the money that the
winners received. This is precisely the question under debate.
Suppose that the winners and losers invested in Schmadoff’s
legitimate investment scheme instead of Madoff’s fraud.
Suppose further that the investment scheme, while profitable
for many years, suddenly goes bust as a result of an
extraordinary event that no one could have predicted and that
was no one’s fault. For example, imagine that a meteor strikes
the building where Schmadoff had his offices, destroying the
Complaint_Against_Certain_Stanford_Investors.pdf. And, the SIPC,
supporting the trustee’s interpretation of net equity, argued that:

in

a

brief

Unless the fictitious trades in BLMIS are avoided, claimants who were
advantaged by the broker’s fraud, that is, investors who received withdrawals
from BLMIS that actually consisted of other investors’ money under the guise of
investment profits . . . will be allowed to benefit at the expense of other equally
innocent investors.
Memorandum of Law of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation in Support of
Trustee’s Motion for an Order Upholding Trustee’s Determination Denying “Customer”
Claims for Amounts Listed on Last Statement, Affirming Trustee’s Determination of Net
Equity, and Expunging Those Objections with Respect to the Determinations Relating to
Net Equity at 36, Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard
L. Madoff), No. 08-01789 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.madofftrustee.com/document/dockets/000450-519-memorandum-of-law.pdf.
123
Warren Seavey & Austin Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REV. 29, 32 (1938).
See generally id. at 36-37 (collecting paradigmatic statements of the doctrine).
124
BIRKS, supra note 9, at 39.
125
Id.
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vault where he had stored half of the investors’ money in
anticipation of a large stock purchase, while the other half was
already invested in the market. Although Schmadoff’s firm was
appropriately insured, insurance does not cover this
contingency, and so half of the money investors thought they
had is now gone. Over the years, some investors withdrew more
money than they had deposited, while other investors had not
recouped all, or even any, of their principal at the time of the
vault’s destruction. The former set of investors would have
been enriched, but it seems a stretch to say that they were
enriched at the expense of the latter, even though their
withdrawals have left fewer resources to be distributed among
the latter. Similarly, the Madoff winners’ withdrawals have
also left fewer resources to be distributed among the losers. But
why should we think that their “winnings” come at the expense
of the losers if we do not think that the Schmadoff winners gain
at the expense of the Schmadoff losers?
Even if the Madoff winners (and perhaps the Schmadoff
winners, too) have gained at the expense of the losers, it is not
at all clear that they have gained unjustly. The paradigmatic
case of unjust enrichment involves the mistaken payment of a
non-existent debt,126 such as when A forgets that she has already
discharged her debt to B and pays B twice. Clearly, the Madoff
case is distinct from this paradigmatic case. Other cases involve
“failures of consideration, shades of fraud and pressure, and
taking advantage of vulnerable people.”127 The second of these
factors is most apt here, and it might ground the losers’ right to
recovery under the following established principle: “If X takes
C’s money without C’s consent and gives it to D, then D becomes
indebted to C in the sum received.”128 Here, X would be Madoff, D
a winner, and C a loser, and the principle would apply so long as
we were licensed in construing the case as one in which Madoff
took the losers’ money without their consent.
In response, one might point to an exception to the
principle and contend that D need not return the money to C if
126

Id. at 5, 73 (referring to this case as “the core of the core” of unjust enrichment
doctrine); Dennis Klimchuk, The Normative Foundations of Unjust Enrichment, in THE
LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 81, 82 (Robert Chambers et al., eds., 2009).
127
BIRKS, supra note 9, at 41-42 (citing these, along with cases of mistake, as
an exclusive list of unjust factors).
128
Id. at 86 (distilling the principle behind the House of Lords’ decision in
Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.) (Eng.)). Cf. Zoe Sinel, Through
Thick and Thin: The Place of Corrective Justice in Unjust Enrichment, 31 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 551, 551 (2011) (“Clearly, one should return what one was not meant to
receive and for which one gave nothing in return.”).
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D received it in exchange for a bona fide purchase. Thus, if an
attorney embezzles money from his law firm and uses it to buy
himself a lavish dinner at the Ritz, the Ritz need not return
any of the proceeds of the meal to the law firm, because it
supplied the food and drink in exchange for the money paid.129
Moreover, this result holds even if the Ritz marks up its prices
exorbitantly to ensure that its profit margin is, for example,
ninety percent of the purchase price.130
Leveraging this exception, one might argue that the
Madoff winners are like suppliers of goods who receive illgotten gains in a genuine, legitimate exchange. This will not
do, however. If Madoff’s fraud vitiates the claimant’s consent
and thereby renders the transfer between a losing investor and
Madoff illicit, then so too it vitiates the legitimacy of the
exchange between Madoff and the winning investor.
As such, this appears to be a case where the law of
unjust enrichment would compel the Madoff winners to return
their winnings to the Madoff losers.131 But it is just at this point
that the law of unjust enrichment is on its weakest footing. To
be sure, courts have found that defendants must return funds
that have been “misdirected from the plaintiff’s bank account
or trust fund by a fraudulent . . . third party,”132 even though
the defendant bears no responsibility for the fraud. The
rationale in these cases emphasizes the plaintiff’s lack of
responsibility for the transfer; the defendant’s lack of
responsibility is taken to be irrelevant.133 But why should this
be? As Kit Barker asks, “Why is the defendant, who is no more
causally implicated in events than anyone else, obliged to
remedy the plaintiff’s bad luck? Is there not an equally strong
case, for example, for compensating the plaintiff . . . from a
public fund, rather than looking to private law for a
restitutionary remedy?”134 Indeed, one might make the point
129

The example is Birk’s variation on the Lipkin Gorman case. See BIRKS,
supra note 9, at 86.
130
See id.
131
Assuming, as I am in this Section, that the Madoff winners in question
were blamelessly ignorant of the fraud, they would have rights of rescission that
protected money withdrawn equal to the principle they had invested. See, e.g., Katz,
supra note 11, at 453-54 (describing the transferee’s right of rescission as an
antecedent debt of the estate, owed in exchange for the value the transferee had
invested with the debtor).
132
Kit Barker, The Nature of Responsibility for Gain: Gain, Harm and Keeping
the Lid on Pandora’s Box, in THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 126, at 162
(citations omitted) (citing relevant case law).
133
Id. at 165-66.
134
Id. at 166.

2012]

RIGHTING OTHERS’ WRONGS

37

more forcefully by arguing that imposing the remedy
exclusively on the defendant treats him as a mere means. It
“uses the defendant as an instrument in the service of the
plaintiff’s interests.”135
One can find two responses to these queries in the
scholarly literature on unjust enrichment, but neither is
ultimately convincing. First, some have suggested that liability
here vindicates not the plaintiff’s particular interest but
instead “the value of autonomy more generally, a value in
which the defendant can be understood to have an interest, no
less than the plaintiff. So liability does not treat the defendant
as a mere means.”136 The argument seems to be that both the
plaintiff and the defendant gain from the imposition of liability
insofar as liability vindicates the autonomy of each. But a
problem remains. The prospect, or even reality, of gain does not
undercut the concern that the defendant is being used as a
mere means. Analogously, we might say that, in cases of false
conviction, the innocent individual who is punished shares in a
benefit that her punishment produces—namely, the general
deterrence that will make others less likely to commit a similar
crime and that will make the defendant less likely to be
victimized by such a crime. Still, the defendant is being treated
as a mere means because she is singled out for punishment
without cause, even if she, along with others, enjoys the benefit
her punishment generates. The defendant serves as an
instrument for the gain, even if the gain is one in which she
can partake.
A second line of response acknowledges that “there is
nothing uniquely, morally significant” about the defendant who
is innocent of the fraud from which he gains.137 Nonetheless, it
makes sense to have him “insure” the plaintiff against her loss
“because he happens to have an obvious surplus fund” (i.e., the
proceeds deriving from the plaintiff’s loss).138 Along these lines,
some allege that a “localised” or “internal” distributive norm
operates between the plaintiff and defendant such that
fairness, rather than corrective justice, compels return of the

135

Klimchuk, supra note 126, at 97. Klimchuk is trying to rescue Hanoch
Dagan’s account of unjust enrichment, according to which the doctrine is intended to
vindicate the value of autonomy generally. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004).
136
Klimchuk, supra note 126, at 97.
137
Barker, supra note 132, at 168 (emphasis omitted).
138
Id.
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money.139 Regardless of the justificatory force of this reasoning
in the standard case of unjust enrichment from a fraud
involving a passive defendant, it is not at all clear that it
applies convincingly to the Madoff clawback suits. The Madoff
winner had a legitimate expectation that his investment would
yield returns; therefore his withdrawals might not constitute
“an obvious surplus fund.” Even those who believe that fairness
normally dictates return of the transferred funds recognize an
exception where returning the transferred funds would cause
the defendant to suffer harm himself.140 In the Madoff case, the
winners relied on the legitimacy of their “winnings”; many of
them spent that money thinking that it had been honestly
invested and earned.141 Because the money that winners would
be forced to give up is not a surplus, they would be worse off at
the end of the day.142 Put differently, fairness does not
necessarily compel the result that arises in the standard case of
unjust enrichment, and that the Madoff trustee demands.143
In sum, one can say that the winners in the Madoff case
have been unjustly enriched only if (i) they have been enriched
at the expense of the losers, and (ii) the circumstances of their
enrichment involve an injustice. But whether or not these
conditions apply depends on our understanding of the
entitlements of winners and losers alike. The law of unjust
enrichment does not illuminate, let alone determine, those
139

See id. at 167 (discussing Dennis Klimchuk, Unjust Enrichment and
Corrective Justice, in UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 111 (J. Neyers et al. eds.,
2004) and PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 208 (2002)).
140
See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 40 (2004); Barker, supra
note 132, at 168.
141
See, e.g., Madoff’s Victims, MADOFFSCANDAL.COM: THE LARGEST FRAUD
THAT THE WORLD HAS EVER SEEN, http://www.madoffscandal.com/madoffs-victims/
(last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (describing Ira Roth, whose withdrawals from his Madoff
account were used to pay for his college tuition and his grandmother’s living expenses).
142
See Barker, supra note 132, at 168.
143
Picard has instituted a hardship program, such that winners who can
demonstrate hardship will be excused from having to return their “winnings.” See The
Hardship Program, MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.madoff.com/hardshipprogram-17.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). The hardship standard that Picard has
set is an onerous one. Among the factors Picard lists in order to qualify for the
hardship program are the following: “[i]nability to pay for necessary living expenses,
such as housing (including loss of home due to foreclosure), food, utilities and
transportation”; “[i]nability to pay for necessary medical expenses”; “[i]nability to pay
for the care of dependents”; and having “[d]eclar[ed] personal bankruptcy.” Id. Yet even
a more liberal standard would not vitiate the concern raised in the text accompanying
this note. Again, the concern is that the defendant may have reasonably relied on the
legitimacy of his earnings and so reasonably spent the money that the trustee now
claims belongs to the plaintiff. Requiring the defendant to repay that money leaves him
worse off even if he is not otherwise financially strapped.
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entitlements. Only a prior inquiry into the relationship that
ought to exist between winners and losers can do so, and I
undertake that inquiry in Part V. It will be useful to turn to the
law of stolen goods first, however, to see whether it can provide
useful insights.
B.

The Law of Stolen Goods

The rule requiring a person who unwittingly purchases a
stolen item to return that item is a fixture of Anglo-American
law and is among the legal rules widely known by the layperson
and legal sophisticate alike. The “He who hath not cannot give”
rule dates back to Roman times,144 and today it can be found in
the UCC,145 as well as in the UCC’s English counterpart.146 Yet,
notwithstanding the entrenched nature of the rule governing
stolen goods, it turns out that there is little to support it, and it
is largely irrelevant to the Madoff case in any event.
Why does the law favor the original owner over the good
faith purchaser of a stolen item? There are two kinds of
rationales adduced in support of the rule—those grounded in
considerations of efficiency, and those grounded in considerations
of fairness. Under the former, it has been argued that resting
priority with the original owner encourages vigilance on the part
of would-be purchasers to ensure proper title in the item they are
thinking about purchasing.147 Prioritizing the original owner also
deters theft, by making it more difficult for the thief to off-load
the fruits of his crime. Yet considerations of efficiency might
weigh just as strongly on the other side. We might instead want
to encourage vigilance on the part of owners to ensure that they
protect their possessions or purchase insurance to cover their
losses. And we might want to ensure the fluidity of the market
for goods by conferring upon the good faith purchaser a sense of
repose.148 So long as he had no reason to know that his purchase
had been stolen from someone else, he may rest easy in the
belief that it will not be repossessed should its origins be
144

See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (2d ed. 1910).
“A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had
power to transfer.” U.C.C. § 2-403 (1989).
146
“[W]here goods are sold by a person who is not their owner, and who does not
sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no
better title to the goods than the seller had.” The Sale of Goods Act, 1979, § 21(1) (U.K.).
147
See, e.g., Derek Fincham, Towards a Rigorous Standard for the Good Faith
Acquisition of Antiquities, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 145, 162 (2010).
148
See Emily A. Graefe, Note, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums
Possessing Nazi-Looted Art, 51 B.C. L. REV. 473, 481 (2010).
145
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uncovered. For precisely these reasons, the rule operates the
opposite way in civil law countries, where good faith
purchasers typically enjoy priority and original owners are
denied recovery. In sum, the efficiency-based considerations for
the rule of stolen goods are hardly decisive in establishing the
original owner’s priority. But nor are the fairness-based
considerations, as we shall now see.
Fairness seeks to favor the original owner on the
presupposition that the original owner will have imbued the
item with more personal meaning than the good faith
purchaser. Where the property in question is “personal” under
Margaret Jane Radin’s conception of that term—being bound
up with its original owner’s conception of herself—it makes
sense to return the item to the original owner.149 Thus, for
example, we can imagine a wedding ring that had been in the
original owner’s family over multiple generations, and for that
reason carries a personal dimension that the good faith
purchaser could not appreciate. Fairness would dictate that we
privilege the property rights of the original owner, who values
the ring for both pecuniary and sentimental reasons, over those
of the good faith purchaser, who has only a pecuniary
attachment to the ring.
A second fairness-based consideration goes not to the
enhanced value the item might hold for the original owner, but
instead to the circumstances of its theft. In these instances, the
original owner has had the item taken from her against her
will.150 As in cases of Nazi-looted art, for example, where the
item was stolen as part of a genocidal campaign,151 we might
say that the original owner has sustained not only a material
loss but also an expressive injury, given the ethnic animus
motivating the crime. In this kind of case, the original owner
has borne the greater loss and, in recognition of that fact,
fairness would again dictate return of the stolen good.
Both of these rationales strike me as no more than
presumptively compelling. In many cases, the more personal
attachment or the more injurious loss may reside on the side of
the original owner. But there will surely be exceptions. For
example, if the good faith purchaser had sold his kidney in
149

See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory
of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 151-52 (1991).
151
See, e.g., Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (affirming a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, who sued the Austrian government for the return of six Gustav
Klimt paintings that had belonged to her family prior to the Holocaust).
150

2012]

RIGHTING OTHERS’ WRONGS

41

order to acquire the funds to buy the wedding ring that had
been an heirloom in the original owner’s family, we might
imagine that his fiancée attaches special significance to the
ring in light of the sacrifice made to get it for her. This
significance might be no less compelling than the significance
that the ring holds for its original owner. Similarly, the original
owner might have sustained a garden-variety theft, while the
good faith purchaser was duped into buying the stolen good as
part of a scam that exploits a special vulnerability, causing the
good faith purchaser and members of her group to suffer. This
is the case in instances of affinity fraud, in which the fraudster
preys upon others with whom he shares ethnic or religious
ties.152 In these cases, the good faith purchaser will have been
subject to an expressive injury (such as one motivated by ethnic
or racial animus) while the original owner was not. In sum, the
fairness rationales appear to provide merely presumptive
reasons for privileging the original owner, not absolute grounds
for doing so.
In any event, it is difficult to see why these rationales
should be relevant when we are dealing with a fungible good,
such as money. The family ring or Nazi-looted Gustav Klimt
painting cannot be shared by two owners, but money can easily
be divided between them. So we need not think about
privileging the winner or the loser of an investment fraud in
the same way that we need to contemplate privileging the
original owner or the good faith purchaser for a theft of a
unique object.
Moreover, there is a further distinction between a case
of stolen goods and financial fraud that is worth underscoring.
In the case of a financial fraud like Madoff’s, each investor was
a potential victim of theft. To return to our two-person Ponzi
scheme involving Smith and Jones, consider the following:
Although Smith cashed out early and Jones was left exposed,
the situation could have proceeded precisely the opposite way,
with Jones cashing out early and Smith bearing the loss.
Further, it is not simply that either of them could have been the
victim of fraud. Each was the victim of fraud. This is true not
152

The SEC defines an affinity fraud as fraud that “prey[s] upon members of
identifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, or professional
groups. The fraudsters who promote affinity scams frequently are . . . members of the
group . . . . These scams exploit the trust and friendship that exist in groups of people
who have something in common.” Affinity Fraud: How to Avoid Investment Scams that
Target Groups, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm (last modified
Sept. 6, 2006).
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only in those cases where winning investors believed they had
money left in their Madoff accounts but later learned that they
would not recover it based on the bankruptcy court’s definition
of net equity. Even the investor who had liquidated her account
and received exactly the amount she believed she was owed can
be said to have been a victim of fraud insofar as she invested her
money under false pretenses. Both were the intended “dupees” of
a fraudster; that only one of them suffered the pecuniary
consequences of having been duped is merely a matter of luck,
for which neither bears responsibility. There is, accordingly, a
moral equivalence between Smith and Jones, and between any
innocent winner and innocent loser in a Ponzi scheme. By
contrast, there need not be a moral equivalence between the
good faith purchaser of a stolen good and the individual from
whom it was stolen; this will especially be the case where the
good has changed hands more than once, and where the last
seller was innocently ignorant of the good’s illicit provenance.
In sum, the law of stolen goods derives its rationale from
a set of potentially dubious presumptions, and these have little
relevance to the relationship between Ponzi scheme winners and
losers in any case. Further, even if one were to remain convinced
that fairness demands loss sharing among Ponzi scheme
winners and losers, it would nevertheless be unfair to proceed
with the clawback suits, given that we do not require innocent
beneficiaries of other kinds of wrongs to share in the losses that
the victims of those wrongs sustain, as we shall now see.
IV.

OTHER ANALOGOUS DOCTRINES?

The legal response to the Madoff case cannot be
assessed in isolation. The Madoff Ponzi scheme collapsed at the
same time as—and as a result of—the 2008 financial
meltdown. With stock values plummeting, Madoff’s customers
sought to withdraw their money en masse, but Madoff was
unable to satisfy all of their claims at once. We know now that
the financial crisis was precipitated in no small part by acts of
wrongdoing. Fraud itself increased in the years preceding the
meltdown.153 Moreover, among the acts and events identified to
153

See Page Perry, LLC, Financial Scams Are Becoming More Common as the
Economy Deteriorates, INVESTMENT FRAUD LAW. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2009),
http://www.investmentfraudlawyerblog.com/2009/04/financial_scams_are_becoming_m.html
(“The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that corporate fraud more than doubled
from 279 cases in 2003 to 529 in 2007 . . . . The financial frauds include various forms
of theft, such as Ponzi Schemes and embezzlement.”).
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have caused the crisis, instances of recklessness, willful
blindness, and exploitation figure prominently.154 Yet the
response to the financial crisis has all but eschewed any grandscale attempt to compensate those who lost money through no
fault of their own. This Part seeks to distinguish the clawback
suits against innocent winners in a Ponzi scheme from other
restitutionary measures that adversely affect innocent
beneficiaries of a corporate or financial wrong. In Part IV.A, I
focus on executive compensation, while in Part IV.B I address
shareholder losses resulting from corporate or financial wrongs.
A.

Executive Compensation Clawbacks

Outside of the avoidance provisions of bankruptcy laws,
the only individuals who are eligible targets for clawback
actions are corporate executives, and only when their
companies issue earnings restatements to correct for earlier
mistaken earnings reports.155 More specifically, each of the
three federal statutes that permit executive compensation
clawbacks developed in response to cases of dramatic financial
wrongdoing. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

154

See, e.g., THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT XV-XX (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf.
155
The focus here is on clawback actions that arise independent of the
clawback target’s participation in the underlying wrong. Since 1971, the SEC has
enjoyed power to seek restitution from corporate executives or corporations that have
engaged in financial fraud, with the inaugural case involving insider trading. SEC v.
Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971). Yet, until the 1990s, the
rationale for these SEC clawback suits was to deter wrongdoing, and not to distribute
the returned money to those whom the insider trading had injured. See SEC v.
Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Although disgorged funds may
often go to compensate securities fraud victims for their losses, such compensation is a
distinctly secondary goal.”); Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 527-28. Compensation
became a primary goal of SEC disgorgement actions “in 1990, when Congress passed
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act. The Penny Stock
Reform Act . . . expressly authorized the SEC to design rules for the distribution of
such awards.” Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 528 (citations omitted). Further, Section
308 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the “Fair Funds” provision, grants the SEC authority to seek
“any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 305(b), 308, 116 Stat. 745, 779
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006)). As Aaron Zimmerman describes,
In the six complete fiscal years since Congress passed the Fair Funds Act, the
SEC has brought between 218 and 335 judicial enforcement actions per year. In
the 2009 calendar year alone, the SEC distributed over $2.1 billion to
investors—more than twice as much as the amount the SEC collected between
1984 and 1992.
See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 529-30 (citations omitted).
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(SOX)156 was passed in the wake of the Enron and Worldcom
scandals;157 the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)158 was
passed in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis and
ensuing financial meltdown in 2007 and 2008;159 and the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA)160 was
passed in conjunction with the bailout program that the
financial meltdown necessitated.161 Under each statute, the
triggering event is a finding that the corporation in question
issued a materially inaccurate earnings statement.162 A further
triggering event occurs under Dodd-Frank upon a finding that
the corporation otherwise materially failed to comply with a
federal securities reporting regulation.163
The scope of each clawback provision varies: SOX
restricts its clawback provisions to the corporation’s CEO and
CFO.164 EESA permits clawing back compensation from the
CEO and the next twenty highest-paid executives.165 And DoddFrank, the most expansive of the three, subjects any executive
of the corporation to a clawback action.166 On the other hand,
Dodd-Frank contemplates a less severe clawback than does
either SOX or EESA. Dodd-Frank restricts the clawback
amount to that in excess of what the executive would have
earned under the correct earnings statement,167 while both SOX
156

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. Nos. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2003).
158
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
159
See William E. Cohen, Foreword to DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES ix (2010).
160
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, div. A, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
122 Stat. 3765.
161
See, e.g., Sandra Seitman, Note, Uncle Sam’s New Piggy Bank: Confronting
Crisis Through TARP and Federal Oversight, BUS. L. BRIEF, Fall/Winter 2009-2010, at 53.
162
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 304(a); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, § 954; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 11(b)(3)(B).
163
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 954.
164
See, e.g., Joseph E. Bachelder III, Clawbacks Under Dodd-Frank and Other
Federal Statutes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 9, 2011,
9:14
AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/09/clawbacks-under-doddfrank-and-other-federal-statutes/.
165
See id.
166
See id.
167
See id. A separate provision of Dodd-Frank applies to failed financial
companies and targets “any current or former senior executive or director substantially
responsible for the failed condition of the covered financial company” for a clawback of
“any compensation received during the 2-year period preceding the date on which the
Corporation was appointed as the receiver of the covered financial company, except
that, in the case of fraud, no time limit shall apply.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 210(S) (2010). Since this
157
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and EESA permit recovery of all of the incentive-based
compensation belonging to the targeted executive.168 The reachback period under Dodd-Frank is the three years preceding the
reporting error or failure, while it is twelve months under SOX
and there is no specified reach-back period under EESA.169
Importantly,
these
statutes
permit
clawbacks
independently of whether the targeted individual bears a
culpable connection to the triggering event.170 Each inflicts its
clawback measures on both “innocent” and culpable executives
alike.171 One might then think that these statutes, similar to the
Ponzi scheme clawback actions, stand for the proposition that an
individual ought not profit from another’s wrongdoing, whether
or not that individual is culpable of the wrongdoing. Nonetheless,
there are significant differences between the executive clawback
statutes and the Ponzi scheme clawback cases.
As compared with the Ponzi scheme clawbacks,
executive clawbacks are at once more compelling and less
harsh. Even in cases where the executive did not participate in
the false or fraudulent financial accounting, one could argue
that restitution of the excess compensation—i.e., the incentivebased pay that used the falsely inflated figures as the basis for
calculating the executive’s bonuses, etc.—is nonetheless
warranted. Under Dodd-Frank, for example, the executive
clawback only rectifies an over-payment and returns the
executive to the position she would have occupied had the
provision contemplates only those officers or directors who bear a culpable connection
to the company’s failure, I do not consider it further.
168
For the relevant provision, see Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay
Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721, 730 (2011).
169
See generally Bachelder, supra note 164.
170
See, e.g., SEC v. Jenkins, No. 09-CV-0510-PHX-RJB, slip op. (D. Ariz. Nov.
16, 2011), available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/SECVJenkins09-cv-1510-136.pdf
(holding that the SEC may claw back executive compensation even when the executive
in question was not guilty of the misconduct that necessitated the restatement); ROPES
& GRAY, COURT SAYS SARBANES-OXLEY ALLOWS “CLAWBACKS” OF EXECUTIVE’S
BONUSES, available at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/09095ca9-bef7-49e2aa9d-45eab883df2f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6fc9ecd8-5f53-45bc-89dc48b37b701ba7/06142010TaxBenefitsAlert.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2012); Bachelder,
supra note 164 (“EESA § 111(b)(3)(B) contains no provision limiting it to cases of
misconduct.”); Liz Skola, The Dodd-Frank Act Requires Publicly-Traded Companies to
Adopt Compensation Clawback Policies, SEC. LITIG. BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010, 9:05 AM),
http://securities.litigation.alston.com/blog.aspx?entry=3869 (“The recent no-fault
interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley clawback is codified in the Dodd-Frank Act
clawback statute.”).
171
For the view that an executive might not be innocent of a corporate wrong
even if she neither participated in, knew about, or was obligated to know about, the
wrong, see Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of
Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 435-45 (2012).
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corporation’s accounting been accurate from the start.172 Thus,
she retains whatever financial rewards are owed to her by
virtue of what the company did in fact earn—unlike the
winning Ponzi scheme investor, who is forced to return all of
her profits.
Further, even the more severe clawbacks that SOX and
EESA permit—where the executive may be compelled to return
all of her incentive-based pay—appear more justifiable than do
the Ponzi scheme clawbacks. For one thing, the executive faces
a shorter reach-back period than does the Ponzi scheme
investor.173 Moreover, the executive may not feel the sting of
any clawback she faces, since corporations are permitted to
insure their officers and directors against clawbacks at the
shareholders’ expense, such that the insurance policy would
cover the executive’s obligations to return money pursuant to a
successful clawback action.174 By contrast, Ponzi scheme
investors cannot insure their investments against fraud.
In any event, even while financial regulators are
permitted to pursue executive clawbacks, this is a remedy that

172

Usha Rodrigues puts the point nicely: “If you get a bonus because you meet
a goal, and it later turns out that the goal wasn’t really met because someone messed
with the numbers, then you need to give the money back. Even if you didn’t do anything
wrong, you didn’t really earn that money.” Usha Rodrigues, Clawbacks, Outrage, and
Interpretation, CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/
08/clawbacks-outrage-and-interpretation.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
173
More specifically, the reach back period is no more than three years under
any of the federal statutes for the executive, while state law permits avoidance of a
fraudulent transfer up to six years prior to the scheme’s collapse. See supra notes 16869 and accompanying text. State law follows one of two forms—the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act (UFCA) or Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA).
There is no uniform reach-back period among UFCA states, though the range is
between two and six years; the UFTA provides a four-year reach-back period. See
White, supra note 88, at 358-59.
174
Reynolds Holding & Una Galani, Pushing Back on Clawbacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2011, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/business/
pushing-back-on-clawbacks.html. For example, the FDIC sued three executives at
Washington Mutual, the failed bank, seeking to recover $900 million from them on the
allegation that they took excessive risks in order to reap short-term profits. See, e.g.,
Louise Story, Ex-Bank Executives Settle F.D.I.C. Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at
B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/business/ex-bank-executivessettle-fdic-suit.html. The executives ended up settling for $64 million, but they paid
only $400,000 of that out of pocket; the remainder was covered by their clawback
insurance. See id. Corporations and insurance companies seek to justify the insurance
coverage by arguing that the clawback provisions are intended for restitutionary, and
not punitive, purposes, and so it doesn’t matter whether the returned money comes
from the executive’s pocket or instead that of the insurance company. See id. Their
position would seem to overlook the deterrent aspect of clawbacks, which can succeed
only if the executive personally suffers a pecuniary consequence as a result of her
company’s mistaken statements.
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commentators revile175 and that even the SEC regulators seem
to shun.176 Although companies issued 4609 earnings
restatements between 2006 and 2009, the SEC exercised its
Sarbanes-Oxley authority to seek executive clawbacks in only
eleven instances.177 While Dodd-Frank’s clawback provisions
were meant to increase the number of such actions by allowing
both shareholders and the SEC to litigate them, this aspect of
Dodd-Frank has met substantial criticism178 and has not been
175

See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, Punishing Innocent Executives: SOX’s Litigation
Time Bomb Goes Off, IDEOBLOG (July 22, 2009, 11:53 AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/
ideoblog/2009/07/punishing-innocent-executives-soxs-litigation-time-bomb-goes-off.html;
Russell G. Ryan, The SEC vs. CEO Pay, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at A.11, available at
http://www.chline.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204619004574324511579902986.html.
176
Cf. Manning G. Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay on Restoration
of Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1135 (bemoaning the under-utilization
of a common law doctrine that would allow private individuals seeking forfeiture of
compensation as a remedy to sue executives who had breached their fiduciary duties).
177
See, e.g., Fried & Shilon, supra note 168, at 731. The SEC took action
against transgressing corporations in a number of notable cases of corporate
wrongdoing. In these cases, the SEC filed complaints against executives implicated in
the wrongdoing but declined to pursue clawbacks. See, e.g., Complaint at 1-2, SEC v.
Dell Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01245 (D.D.C. July 22, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2010/comp21599.pdf (SEC’s action against Dell Computers, its
CEO, and its CFO for overstating earnings between 2002 and 2006); see also Taking
Away Dell’s Cookie Jar, ECONOMIST ONLINE (July 23, 2010, 5:58 PM)
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/07/dells_sec_settlement. Dell agreed to
pay a penalty of $100 million to settle SEC charges that it “manipulated its accounting
over an extended period to project financial results that the company wished it had
achieved.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Dell and Senior
Executives with Disclosure and Accounting Fraud (July 22, 2010) (citation omitted)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-131.htm. The CEO and CFO each “agreed to pay a $4 million
penalty to settle the case without admitting or denying wrongdoing, but didn’t return
any pay,” which implies that this was not a true “clawback.” Kara Scannell, Clawbacks
Divide SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703988304575413671786664134.html.
Similarly, in a case brought by the SEC against Hank Greenberg, former
CEO of AIG, the SEC alleged that under Greenberg’s leadership AIG “faced a number
of financial challenges that, had they been properly reported or accounted for, would
have exposed significant missteps in AIG’s operations and caused the company to miss
certain key earnings and growth targets.” Complaint at 46, SEC v. Greenberg, No. 09
Civ. 6939 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/SECcomplaintgreenberg806.pdf. The SEC complaint sought disgorgement
of ill-gotten gains and civil penalties pursuant to Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act
(15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2010)) but, of particular relevance here, did not seek to clawback
any incentive-based compensation, even though the SEC had the authority to do so
under Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Id.; see also Stephen Bainbridge, “Unlike French
wine, fraud cases don’t get better with age,” PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 11, 2009,
12:19
PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/08/
unlike-french-wine-fraud-cases-dont-get-better-with-age.html.
178
See, e.g., Donald Delves, Clawback Requirement Removes Board Discretion,
FORBES (July 14, 2009, 10:09 AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/donalddelves/
2011/07/14/clawback-requirement-removes-board-discretion/. Delves argues that
clawbacks are ill-advised because they may make accounting departments less likely to
uncover errors as employees within these departments will fear retaliation from the
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invoked even in cases involving the financial institutions whose
failures brought the global markets to the brink of collapse.179
Finally, even if executive clawback actions were to
become commonplace, they would still be a far cry from
investor clawback actions, the tool of choice in the recovery
efforts of the Madoff trustee.180 The difference arises, at least in
part, because unlike the innocent Ponzi scheme investor, the
executive cannot plausibly contend that she reasonably relied
on the veracity of the earnings statement and, in turn, the
legitimacy of her bonus payment for the year in question. The
executive is not a disinterested party without access to the
relevant financial records, who simply takes the statements
and the money that they engender at face value.181 This is not to
CEO who is forced to return incentive-based pay. Id. Alternatively, Delves argues that
clawbacks may just encourage boards to structure executive pay in a way that does not
key it to the company’s performance. Id. Such board action would run counter to DoddFrank’s goal of aligning the interests of the executive and her corporation. Greg
Michaels, G20 Leaders Have the Right Idea, DEALBREAKER (Sept. 16, 2009, 10:17 AM),
http://dealbreaker.com/2009/09/g20-leaders-have-the-right-idea/ (offering the tongue-incheek suggestion that politicians zealous about clawbacks should consider passing
legislation that would allow for recoupment of a politician’s salary in the event that her
successor inherits problems for which she bears responsibility).
179
Thus,
James E. Cayne, the former chief executive of Bear Stearns, still lives in his
$28.24 million apartment at the Plaza Hotel; Joseph J. Cassano the former chief
executive of A.I.G. Financial Products, kept more than $100 million in
compensation; and E. Stanley O’Neal, who was the chief executive of Merrill
Lynch, retired with a pay package valued at more [than] $300 million.
Steven M. Davidoff, In F.D.I.C.’s Proposal, Incentive for Excessive Risk Remains, N.Y.
TIMES (DEALBOOK) (Apr. 12, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/
in-f-d-i-c-s-proposal-incentive-for-excessive-risk-remains/.
180
The law does prohibit a corporation from issuing dividends if it is
insolvent, or if the distribution would make it so. See Clark, supra note 94, at 554-60.
So, shareholders are prospectively barred from receiving funds that would hinder
repayment of the corporation’s creditors. But a prospective bar on receiving a profit to
which one is not affirmatively entitled is a far cry from a claim that one must return a
received profit to which one legitimately believed oneself entitled. In any event, there are a
number of ways in which the corporation can circumvent the bar, as Clark details. Id. at
556-58. Shareholders might well receive profits that would diminish the assets available
for distribution to the corporation’s creditors. Further, the circumstances under which
these profits would be subject to clawback are far more constrained than the general
clawback provisions. See id. at 558-59 n.154 (There are “provisions in corporate laws
specifically stating the conditions under which stockholders may be liable to corporate
creditors for improper dividends received . . . . Some of these provisions are clearly more
lenient than those applicable to the ordinary fraudulent transferee or grantor, e.g.,
provisions immunizing from any duty to disgorge dividends those stockholders who were
ignorant of the impropriety of the dividends, even when the dividends were paid while the
corporation was insolvent.” (citation omitted)).
181
One way to put the difference between the executive’s relationship to her
company’s financial performance and the winning Ponzi scheme investor’s relationship
to the actual finances of the scheme would be to note that the latter is an “arm’s length
bargain,” while the former is not. See, e.g., Merrill v. Abbott (In re Universal Clearing
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suggest that there is an implicit kind of culpability that the
executive bears—i.e., negligence or a failure of due diligence—
which justifies the clawback. The executive may be genuinely
and permissibly ignorant of the financial errors. Still, it is her
corporation, and if its earnings statements contain errors, she
should be denied the benefits of the mistake.182
Instead, a more promising parallel to the Ponzi scheme
clawback case is the circumstance in which an innocent
shareholder suffers pecuniary consequences as a result of a
wrong committed by the corporation.
B.

Shareholder-Funded Restitution

Two general kinds of cases occur where shareholders
appear to suffer pecuniary consequences as a result of
corporate conduct of which they are innocent. The first is the
garden-variety case where the corporation faces a fine or
damages award and paying it will lower share value. Though
the shareholder thereby incurs a potential loss, this is not a
true clawback because the shareholder is not being asked to
return money that she had already received. Nonetheless, it is
worth examining this case because one might think it
represents a strand of doctrine where innocent investors suffer
in order to defray the losses of the victims of another’s wrong—
in this case, the corporation’s. Accordingly, it is possible that
this example could provide support for clawbacks targeting
innocent Ponzi scheme investors. The second kind of case
involves straightforward shareholder clawbacks and arises
when an insolvent corporation has undergone a leveraged
buyout. Here, the creditors can seek to reclaim money that the
corporation’s former shareholders received in selling their
shares to the corporation’s management-cum-owners in the
leveraged buy-out (LBO) process.

House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 862 (D. Utah 1987) (stating that the test for good faith “is
whether the transaction in question bears the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain”)
(citation omitted). Madoff himself insisted that his investors lacked both the financial
wherewithal and the means to have uncovered the fraud: “Although I explained the
Strategy to them they were not sophisticated enough to evaluate it properly . . . . They
were not in a position to perform the necessary due diligence and did not have access to
necessary financial info or records.” See Toobin, supra note 8, at 15 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also id. at 19.
182
Cf. Sepinwall, supra note 171, at 434 (providing an account that would
hold executives responsible for corporate wrongs independent of whether the executives
satisfy the traditional hallmarks of individual culpability).
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1. Consequences to Shareholders of Corporate
Wrongdoing
When a corporation finds itself faced with a financial
penalty or significant damages judgment, shareholders might
see the value of their shares drop.183 This might seem unfair in
light of the traditional separation between ownership and
control, which entails that shareholders have no say over the
corporation’s day-to-day activities184 and therefore no available
means to prevent the wrongful conduct that precipitates a
penalty or judgment. Moreover, the unfairness would be even
more apparent in cases where those who hold shares at the
time of redress purchased their shares after the wrongdoing
had occurred but at a price that did not reflect the possibility
that the corporation might face the specific penalty or
judgment in question—for example, because the corporate
wrong had not been disclosed or even discovered at the time
the investor purchased her shares.
To make matters more concrete, consider fraud-on-themarket cases, where the corporation misstates its financial
situation and paints a rosier picture than is warranted. In light
of the fraudulent statement, share prices rise. To take
advantage of the rise in share price, some investors holding
shares in the corporation choose to sell, and those who buy the
shares then pay an artificially inflated price. When the fraud
comes to light, those who bought the shares at an inflated price
will sue the corporation for damages, rather than the exshareholders who profited from the corporation’s fraud. If the
buying shareholders prevail in their suit, it is the corporation’s
current shareholders—who might well include the plaintiffs in
the suit!—who will suffer, at least if the corporation’s share
price drops as a result.185

183

See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1495 (1996) (“Imposing sanctions on a corporation for
the acts of its managers or employees presumably decreases the corporation’s net
worth. Shareholders [. . .] bear the brunt of such a decrease . . . .” (citation omitted)).
Cf. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 349
(1996) (addressing criminal fines, and arguing that “in the case of a corporation, the
burden of a punitive award will fall primarily on the shareholders, most of whom
usually have no connection to the wrongdoing in question.”).
184
The classic text articulating this conception of the corporation is ADOLF
BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
185
See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy
of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011).
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One might then be inclined to say that the SEC’s actions
here require innocent parties to contribute to defraying the
losses of the victims of a wrong, in much the same way that
innocent Ponzi scheme “winners” are made to contribute to
defraying the losses of the “losers” of the Ponzi scheme. But
there are important distinctions. For one thing, it is not clear
that those who own shares at the time the corporation is
subject to the penalty or judgment do in fact sustain a loss. The
company’s share price might take a dip, but unless the
shareholder is compelled to sell in the immediate aftermath of
the penalty’s imposition, this may represent only a paper loss.
Second, shareholders enjoy limited liability; the most any
shareholder can lose is the amount of her investment. By
contrast, a Ponzi scheme winner who no longer has the money
subject to the clawback can, in principle, have her wages
garnished or assets seized in order to satisfy the trustee’s
claims against her. Third, if the company is forced to disgorge
only the funds corresponding to the total amount by which the
share value was artificially inflated, and without incurring an
additional financial penalty, then the current shareholders
come to occupy a position no worse than the one they would
have occupied had the fraud never occurred. Finally, it is not
the loss in share value that compensates the corporation’s
victims. The money shareholders lose is not the same money
that helps to make the victims whole. Indeed, the drop in share
price may correspond only very loosely to the fine or damages
award that has been imposed on the corporation.186 For all of
these reasons, cases where innocent shareholders sustain a loss
in share value as a result of the corporation’s restitutionary or
compensatory obligations are vastly different from those faced
by innocent investors in the Madoff clawback actions, who may
be compelled to return money that they legitimately thought
was theirs in order to compensate the Madoff losers. As such,
innocent shareholders in these cases do not face the unfairness
that the innocent targets of a Ponzi scheme clawback suit face.
In fact, it is not clear that the former face any unfairness at all.

186

This would be the case if, for example, analysts project that the corporation
stands to earn significant profits in the coming quarters and these projections offset
the reduction in share price caused by the penalty.
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2. Shareholder Clawbacks in the Wake of a Leveraged
Buyout
There is, however, one type of case where a shareholder
can be required to return money she made in the market—
namely, where she has sold her shares as part of an LBO and
the target corporation goes bankrupt shortly thereafter. In a
typical LBO, management privatizes a publicly traded
corporation by buying back all of the outstanding shares and
delisting the corporation. In order to purchase the outstanding
shares, management often borrows money from a third-party—
e.g., a bank—and secures its loan with the target corporation’s
assets, thereby increasing the target corporation’s liabilities to the
potential detriment of the corporation’s existing creditors.187 As
one commentator explains, the corporation’s “new debt is likely to
be senior secured debt. Thus, by definition, LBOs adversely affect
existing creditors of the company by reducing the assets available
for the satisfaction of obligations owed to them.”188
In the event that the acquired corporation becomes
insolvent shortly after the buyout, the question arises as to
whether the share purchases constituted fraudulent transfers,
such that a bankruptcy trustee would be permitted to seek to
claw back the money that the former shareholders received
when they sold their shares to management.189 Some
commentators and courts have argued that the fraudulent
transfer provisions should not extend to the LBO context.190
Nonetheless, the vast majority of courts have approved the use
of clawback suits against former shareholders in this context.191
Requiring former shareholders to return money in the
wake of the insolvency of a corporation in which they no longer
187

See, e.g., Borowitz & Hahn, supra note 114, at 67, 70-71; Robert J. White,
Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Conveyance Laws Under the Bankruptcy Code—Like
Oil and Water, They Just Don’t Mix, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 359, 362 & n.29 (1992).
188
Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and Going Under, 63 IND. L.J. 781, 786
(1987–1988).
189
In addition to pursuing clawbacks against the former shareholders, the
bankruptcy trustee could also target the lending bank, which has been “arguably
enriched at [the] creditors’ expense,” Franci J. Blassberg & John M. Vasily, The
Lender’s Perspective on Leveraged Acquisitions, 676 PLI/Corp 69, 127 (1990).
190
See, e.g., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 1988); Baird &
Jackson, supra note 96, at 834.
191
See generally Borowitz & Hahn, supra note 114, at 78 (noting that “the
applicability of fraudulent conveyance law, as currently enacted, to leveraged buyouts
is clear, and the vast majority of courts to have considered the issue have so held” and
collecting representative cases). For a scholarly defense of this doctrinal development
that seeks to counter Baird and Jackson’s arguments (see supra note 94), see generally
Smyser, supra note 188.
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hold shares might seem like the height of unfairness—both
because the shareholders had presumably given “fair value” in
the form of their ownership shares and because the shareholders
appear to be innocent of the conduct leading to the acquired
corporation’s bankruptcy. As such, we might think that there
are relevant similarities between this set of clawbacks and the
clawbacks that innocent investors in a Ponzi scheme face. A
closer look, however, reveals important differences.
First, there need be no relationship between the price at
which the shareholders sell their shares and the fair market
value of the shares. In a barely solvent corporation, for
example, the price that management is willing to pay may be
keyed to the amount of the loan it can secure, rather than the
value of the equity interest in the company. The bank might
determine the loan amount without regard to the corporation’s
already existing debt. After all, the bank will enjoy priority over
existing creditors; as long as the target corporation can secure
the bank’s loan, the bank has no reason to concern itself with the
corporation’s existing obligations.192 Thus, in a world without
shareholder clawbacks, an LBO would be attractive to a “buyer,
seller and third party lender precisely because it [would] allow[]
all parties to the buyout to shift some portion of the risk of loss
associated with their investment in the company to the
‘investors’ in the company who are not involved in the buyout—
the other creditors.”193 This is especially true in the case where
the target corporation is already financially troubled, since the
shareholders couldn’t readily sell their shares on the secondary
market. An LBO thereby provides them with a way both to
obtain more money for their shares than they otherwise could,
and to “withdraw[] their capital from exposure to total loss in
the event the company [were to go] bankrupt.”194 Moreover,
unlike the case in which the corporation incurs more debt to
fund an entrepreneurial activity that might eventually be
profitable, “a leveraged buyout involves a transaction in which
the corporate debtor pledges valuable assets ‘without getting
anything in return’ because the loan proceeds are used to pay
the selling shareholders.”195
Further, the existing shareholders are not without the
power to promote, or even mandate, the LBO. In the process,
192
193
194
195

See Smyser, supra note 188, at 798.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 803.
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the existing shareholders effectively jump the queue that would
exist in the event of a bankruptcy, given that the shareholders’
equity interest in the company is subordinate to the claims of
the company’s creditors. Had the public corporation gone
bankrupt, the shareholders would have been able to claim only
the value remaining after creditors had been paid; by forcing
the corporation to buy back the shareholders’ stock before the
company declares bankruptcy, the shareholders enjoy a priority
over the company’s creditors that they are not entitled to.
The role shareholders play in an LBO, then, is not like
the role innocent winners play in a Ponzi scheme. Instead, the
shareholders’ role more closely resembles the role played by a
group of Ponzi scheme investors who, knowing of the fraud and
seeing the scheme approach the brink of collapse, encourage its
operator to find new investors or seek to recruit new investors
themselves.196 These investors participate in the scheme in a
way that makes them complicit in it;197 they hardly count as
innocent winners.198 It does not seem at all unfair to require
such accomplices to return any money they have withdrawn.
Doing so is consistent with the classic dictate that an
individual may not profit from her own wrongdoing199 but
instead must redress her victims.200 In a similar vein, it is not
untoward to ask the former shareholders of an LBO to return
the money they received from selling their shares where they
encouraged, or perhaps even directed, the sale. Again, all of
196

This is the role that Sonja Kohn, an Austrian banker, is alleged to have
played in the Madoff Ponzi scheme. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques & Peter Lattman,
Madoff Trustee Seeks $19.6 Billion from Austrian Banker, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK)
(Dec. 10, 2010, 12:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/madoff-trusteeseeks-19-6-billion-from-austrian-banker (“[A]ccording to the complaint [Picard filed
against Kohn], she knowingly raised billions of dollars in cash to sustain Mr. Madoff’s
fraud in exchange for at least $62 million in secret kickbacks . . . .”).
197
See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (1985) (stating that a person is
criminally liable as an accomplice if “(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating
the commission of the offense, he, (i) solicits [the] other person to commit it, or (ii) aids
or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it, or (iii)
having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort
[to prevent it]”).
198
But cf. Sharp Int’l Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Sharp Int’l
Corp.), 403 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding no lack of good faith where bank knew that
Ponzi scheme operator was recruiting new investors to raise funds to repay bank,
because bank did not encourage the conduct and bank had no duty to notify the
recruited investors that they were going to be duped).
199
See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 506 (1889) (denying grandson his
inheritance because he killed his grandfather precisely in order to benefit from the
provisions of the deceased’s will). For an extended discussion of the case, see RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15-20, 130-31 (1986).
200
See 1 HILLIARD, supra note 1, at 83.
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this suggests that the typical shareholders in an LBO are
situated differently from the innocent investors in a Ponzi
scheme.201 From the now well-established practice of clawing
back money from the investors in the LBO context, then, we
cannot infer anything about the justifiability of clawbacks
against innocent Ponzi scheme winners.
V.

EXPANDING RESTITUTION

In Part II, I argued that only a very strained reading of
the fraudulent transfer provisions would support clawing back
money from innocent Ponzi scheme investors, and in Parts III
and IV, I sought to establish that no other doctrine permits
reclaiming money from the innocent beneficiaries of a wrong who
reasonably relied on the authenticity of their earnings and whose
profits cannot be construed as a windfall. Therefore, the clawback
suits against innocent winners in a Ponzi scheme are anomalous.
These winners incur restitutionary obligations that the law does
not impose on other innocent beneficiaries of a wrong.
At this point, one could seek to repudiate clawback suits
altogether, arguing that if we are not prepared to have the
innocent beneficiaries of wrongdoing restitute the wrongdoing’s
victims across the board, we should not do so in the Ponzi
scheme context alone. Instead, this Part adopts the opposite
approach, arguing that we should recruit all innocent investors
in our attempts to make the victims of financial fraud whole in
201

But what about the former shareholder who did nothing to encourage, let
alone direct, the leveraged buyout, and who did not know and had no reason to know
that the company would be over-leveraged if the LBO were to occur? Is she not in a
position that is the moral equivalent of the innocent Ponzi scheme winner? It strikes
me that even here there is firmer justification for a clawback against the shareholder
than against the winner, for as a result of the LBO the shareholder succeeds in enjoying a
higher priority than the company’s creditors, even while the creditors would have had a
higher priority than the shareholder had both still had an interest in the company at the
time of its bankruptcy. By contrast, the winner has a priority equal to that of the loser, and
so at least cannot be accused of having jumped the queue, as it were. Nevertheless, even if
the shareholder in question has played no role in encouraging the LBO, and even if we set
aside the concern about her enjoying undue priority over the corporation’s creditors, it is
not clear that a clawback action against her serves to undermine the objections to a
clawback action against the innocent Ponzi scheme winner. Instead, we might well want to
object to clawback actions against both. Cf. In re Estate of Wolf & Vine, Inc., 77 B.R. 754,
760 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (objecting to a clawback suit in the wake of an LBO against innocent
former shareholders, on the ground that the share purchase “was an entirely fair
transaction from the seller’s perspective. In the Court’s view, it is an unwarranted
extension of the fraudulent conveyance laws, or any laws, to attempt to deprive [the former
shareholders] of the value they received in exchange for their business.”), aff’d sub nom.
Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988). Both cases, that is, might well involve an
indefensible effort to recoup money in order to defray another’s losses.
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Part V.A, and beginning to develop a proposal for how this
might be done in Part V.B.
A.

The Winners Reasonably Believed in the Authenticity of
Their Winnings

While the innocent Ponzi scheme winners are no less
entitled to the “profits” they withdrew than are its losers, nor
are they more entitled to them. However, the same can be said
of any investor who profits from an arms-length investment.
The innocent winners in a Ponzi scheme are no less entitled to
their earnings than the winners in a legitimate investment
scheme are entitled to the money they earn on their
investment. That is the central insight motivating the
arguments set forth here.
Where some investors come out ahead and others come
out behind, and where luck is the only feature that separates
the two, we might well want to counteract its effects. It is
better to reclaim some money from the winners and transfer it
to the losers, so that all share in the losses equitably. This is
not to say that all cases in which fortune chooses the winner
entail an obligation, or even a reason, for the winner to share
her winnings among all of the game’s participants. For
example, we would not think that the person holding a winning
lottery ticket has any reason, let alone an obligation, to share
the jackpot with all of the other lottery ticketholders.
One clear way to draw a line between the lottery case
and the Ponzi scheme case is to look to the participants’
reasonable expectations. The lottery ticketholders know that
only one of them will win, that the others will have supplied
the money the winner wins, and that luck alone will determine
the winner. The Ponzi scheme investors, on the other hand,
reasonably conceive of themselves as sitting in the same boat:
All who invest at the same time would win or lose together, and
whether they were to win or lose would turn, they believe, on
the scheme operator’s investment savvy, not the point in time
at which they were to choose to withdraw their funds (which
cannot be said to enhance or diminish the putative investors’
level of desert, given their presumed ignorance of the
fraudulent nature of the scheme).202 At least in cases of financial
202

See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (presenting reasons to think
the Madoff Ponzi scheme winners were blamelessly ignorant of his fraud). A real-life
case bears out the claim that those Ponzi scheme winners who cashed out early are no
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wrongdoing, where all investors are innocent and yet some
profit from the wrongdoing while others lose out, we might
want those who have come out ahead to help defray the losses
of those who would have otherwise come out behind.203
Two questions present themselves at this point. First,
why should we conceive of the scope of restitution as specific to
a particular fraud, such that there is a special restitutionary
relationship between the winners and losers of that fraud,
rather than a general relationship that operates between
winners and losers in the market as a whole? Second, why
think that only those who benefit from a fraud may be made to
offer restitution, rather than thinking that anyone who wins in
the market—whether through a fraudulent or legitimate
investment vehicle—ought to contribute? I address these
questions in turn.
Suppose that we were to decide that the “winners” in
some financial frauds should have to give up their winnings
and that the “losers” should receive compensation. Why require
that restitution operate strictly between winners and losers of
more or less deserving than those who had open accounts at the time of the scheme’s
collapse and lost money they had invested or at least profits they thought they had
earned: Steve Simkin and Laura Blank divorced in 2006, split the $5.4 M in their
Madoff account equally between them. Ms. Blank cashed out shortly thereafter,
receiving 50% of the then-stated value of the money in their Madoff account. Mr.
Simkin did not seek to withdraw most of his share of the money in the Madoff account
and, when the scheme went bust, he lost the money he believed the account had held. He
sought to sue Ms. Blank for a rescission of this part of their divorce agreement, arguing
that, unbeknownst to them at the time, the Madoff account never existed, and so should
not have been counted among the couple’s joint assets. Mr. Simkin lost at the trial level,
but won on appeal. New York’s highest state court then reversed, on the ground that the
Madoff account did exist—at least until December 2008, any time before which Mr.
Simkin could have sought to cash out for the full amount he believed the account
contained. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Court Says Madoff Victim Can’t Redo Terms of His
Divorce, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) (Apr. 3, 2012, 7:51 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/04/03/court-says-madoff-victim-can’t-redo-terms-of-his-divorce/.
The Simkin-Blank dispute, then, presents us with a case in which a court
effectively refuses to compel a particular winner to restitute a particular loser even
though the court had no reason to think that the winner deserved her winnings any
more than the loser deserved his losses.
Other cases in which one set of participants in a game or scheme fares far
better than another solely as a matter of luck may be more complicated. (Consider, for
example, the fortunes of the shareholders of a non-mining corporation at the time that
it unexpectedly strikes gold relative to those of the prior shareholders who had cashed
out before the gold strike.) I leave these more complicated cases to one side.
203
The notion that the winners and losers sit in the same boat appears to
have escaped the notice of some members of both parties, as they proceed on an “every
man for himself,” basis, to use the words of one Madoff investor, and engage in a
“reality-show kind of fighting.” Eric Konigsberg, Investors in a Competition for a Piece of the
Madoff Pie, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at B1 (quoting one of the Madoff claimants) (internal
quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/29madoff.html.
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the same fraud? That is, why should the Madoff winners
restitute the Madoff losers, rather than investors who were
defrauded by Countrywide, for example? We now know that
Countrywide overcharged customers who were desperately
hanging onto their home loans—a federal offense for which it
paid $108 million in fines204—and discriminated against Black
and Hispanic borrowers, for which it paid an additional $335
million fine.205 These fines presumably diminished the share
value of those who held shares in Bank of America, which
acquired Countrywide in 2008, at the time the fines were paid.
Those who sold shares in Countrywide or Bank of America
before the offenses were uncovered presumably received more
money for their shares than they were worth, since
Countrywide’s offenses inflated the share value at the time of
sale.206 It might then be reasonable to think that the investors
who innocently profited by selling Countrywide’s fraudulently
inflated shares owe some or all of the profits they earned to
those who bought the shares at an artificially inflated price, or
to those whose shares diminished in value as a result of
Countrywide’s fines. But again, why think that restitution
should operate just between the Countrywide investors?
To take an example that hits even closer to the Madoff
scandal, consider that shareholders in “J.P. Morgan Chase
[collectively] earned after-tax profits totaling $435 million
between 1993 and 2008 as a result of the billions of dollars
Madoff deposited in the bank using his investors’ money.”207 Yet
no clawbacks are being pursued against these shareholders.
Why shouldn’t the Madoff winners help defray the
losses of the Countrywide losers, and why shouldn’t the
Countrywide or J.P. Morgan Chase winners help make the

204

Fed. Trade Comm’n, Press Release: Countrywide Will Pay $108 Million for
Overcharging Struggling Homeowners; Loan Servicer Inflated Fees, Mishandled Loans
of Borrowers in Bankruptcy (June 7, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/
countrywide.shtm.
205
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Countrywide Will Settle a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/ussettlement-reported-on-countrywide-lending.html.
206
See, e.g., Ben Protess, Bank of America Profit Drops 37%, N.Y. TIMES
(DEALBOOK) (Apr. 15, 2011, 7:27 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/bank-ofamerica-profit-drops-nearly-36/?smid=pl-sare (“Bank of America reported a 37 percent
drop in first-quarter earnings on Friday, as the nation’s biggest bank continued to
battle the legacy of the mortgage crisis and legal problems linked to the ill-fated
acquisition of Countrywide Financial.”).
207
Louis R. Davis & Linus Wilson, Estimating JP Morgan Chase’s Profits
from the Madoff Deposits, 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1, 107-19 (2011).
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Madoff losers whole?208 The answer is surely related in part to
administrative convenience; the trustee in the Madoff case does
not have authority to claw back money from individuals who
did not have accounts with Madoff. However, administrative
convenience is relevant only if we have already determined
that there is an obligation on the part of those who win in a
fraudulent scheme of which they were ignorant to defray the
losses of those who lose, whether from that same fraudulent
scheme or from another. The innocent winners in a Ponzi
scheme are not more responsible for the losers’ losses than is
anyone else who is innocent of the fraud. So, we must turn to
the second question—why think that those who innocently
profit from a fraud bear obligations of restitution that those
who profit from a legitimate investment lack?
This question lacks a good answer. The innocent
winners in a Ponzi scheme are innocent not just in the sense
that they did not know—and had no reason to know—of the
fraud, but also in the sense that, from their perspective, their
withdrawals represented earnings as legitimate as the
earnings they would have reaped from a genuine investment
vehicle. It is on this ground that Judge Rakoff held that
innocent investors in Madoff’s scheme may avail themselves of
the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision,209 which
“precludes the Trustee from bringing any action to recover from
any of Madoff’s customers any of the monies paid by Madoff
Securities to those customers except in the case of actual
fraud.”210 Importantly, Judge Rakoff readily acknowledged that
no securities were bought or sold, and that Madoff himself
would not have been permitted to avail himself of the safe
harbor provision.211 Nonetheless, “[f]rom the standpoint of
Madoff Securities’ customers (except for any who were actual
participants in the fraud), the settlement payments made to
them by Madoff Securities were entirely bona fide, and they
208

Alan Strudler has intriguingly pursued questions of this kind in the
context of large-scale accidents. Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and Moral Principles, 11 L.
& PHIL. 297, 323-25 (1992). Strudler argues that even if one is merely causally
responsible, and not morally responsible for accidental harm, one nonetheless bears an
obligation to repair the harm that innocent bystanders lack. Whatever the merits of
Strudler’s account for cases of mere causal responsibility, it is inapposite where, as
here, one cannot even say that the innocent beneficiaries of the fraud caused the injury
that the losers sustained.
209
Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The safe harbor
provision is contained in 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
210
Katz, 462 B.R. at 451-52.
211
See Picard v. Katz, 466 B.R. 208, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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therefore are fully entitled to invoke the protections of section
546(e) [i.e., the safe harbor provision].”212 Judge Rakoff also
implied elsewhere that what matters is the investors’
reasonable belief and, so long as that belief is reasonable, the
court must treat the investors as if the belief were true,213 at
least for purposes of the avoidance actions.214
Judge Rakoff’s position supports the idea that the
innocent investors reasonably relied on the authenticity of
their withdrawals. Where a Madoff winner spent the money
she withdrew—whether on grandchildren’s college tuition,
living expenses, or even extravagant travel215—it might be
unfair to pursue a clawback action against her, even if she is
not so destitute as to be able to meet the trustee’s hardship
standard.216 More to the point, since the latter set of investors
has no more ground for relying on the legitimacy of their
withdrawals than the winning Ponzi scheme investors have, it
is unfair to treat Ponzi scheme winners differently from
investors who withdraw money from a legitimate investment
vehicle. As one commentator notes, “by what grace of God were
many of us fortunate enough not to have relied on a

212

Katz, 462 B.R. at 452 n.3.
See, e.g., Katz, 466 B.R. at 211 (“[If] Madoff Securities was fairly viewed by
the defendants and other customers as engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities . . . [then] the Trustee . . . may well be barred from [pursuing
avoidance actions except in cases of actual fraud due] to the application of § 546(e).”
(emphasis added)).
214
Peter Henning has noted that Rakoff’s position conflicts with the Second
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investors believed they had in their Madoff accounts. See Henning, supra note 12. Still,
Rakoff did not have before him the question of what investors were owed; he was
addressing the different question of what they could, or could not, be made to return. It
is possible that there is a principled basis upon which one could credit the investors’
reasonable beliefs for purposes of the clawback suits but not for purposes of
determining their net equity.
215
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THE WORLD HAS EVER SEEN, http://www.madoffscandal.com/madoffs-victims/ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2012) (describing Ira Roth, whose withdrawals from his Madoff account were
used to pay for his college tuition and his grandmother’s living expenses); U.S. Attorney’s
Letter and Attached Victim Impact Statements (Mar. 13, 2009), United States v. Madoff,
No. 09 Crim. 213 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
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Sue Rehage to Senators Baucus, Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Committee
members, which stated: “As a result [of our Madoff losses], our traveling will be curtailed
with no more 9 or 10 weeks with the grandkids which is disappointing for all of us. Now it
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For Picard’s list of the indicators he believes relevant to determining
hardship, see Hardship Program, THE MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE,
http://www.madoff.com/hardship-program-17.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
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Madoff . . . or somebody like [him]?”217 It may be no more than
“dumb luck” that separates Ponzi scheme winners from those
who win in a legitimate investment.218 And why should luck play
such a decisive role in how one fares?219 In particular, why should
we expect more from the innocent beneficiaries of a fraud than
we expect from the innocent beneficiaries of a legitimate
investment? The simple answer is that we should not.
If this correct, one of two implications follows—either
we should permit losses to remain where they fall, or we should
enlist the Ponzi scheme winners along with all other
investment winners to provide restitution. If the foregoing
comments about luck have any intuitive appeal, they militate
strongly in favor of the latter alternative. To allow losses to
remain where they fall is to allow luck to govern how the
winning and losing investors fare. But we can do better than
that; we need not bow to luck’s whims. A form of restitution
that gathers resources from all investment winners provides a
more appropriate solution.
B.

Market-Wide Restitution

A handful of commentators have championed the idea
that winners and losers in a Ponzi scheme should together
share in the losses the fraud has caused. Yet these
commentators contemplate only intra-scheme restitution; they
presume but do not defend the existence of a special connection
binding the winners of a particular fraud to the losers of that
fraud.220 By contrast, Part V.A demonstrated that all of those
217

Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Disclosure and Judgment: “We Have Met Madoff and
He Is Ours,” 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 139, 139 n.1 (2009).
218
Id. at 139.
219
Indeed, many Madoff winners maintain that they were actually less greedy
than were other winning investors in the market, having forsaken higher returns for
Madoff’s steady but comparatively modest returns. So, if one did want to invoke the
notion of desert, the Madoff winners would, at least on this basis, fare better than the
investors in legitimate but aggressive and higher-performing schemes. See, e.g., Jon
Healy, Are Bernard Madoff’s Victims Greedy?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011, 2:58 PM),
http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2011/08/are-bernard-madoffs-victims-greedy.html.
Cf. Complaint at *2 ¶ 3, Haines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins., 2009 WL 958069 (D. Mass.
2009) (No. 1:09cv10182), available at http://clients.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/
haines.pdf (seeking class action relief against Madoff feeder funds and alleging that
“[p]laintiffs and the other investors in these funds were not wild speculators rolling the
dice for high returns, but rather safe-conservative investors looking to protect and grow
their retirement funds.”).
220
See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 408-10 (arguing for the desirability
of ex ante clawbacks—i.e., provisions in the contract that a prospective investor signs
that requires the investor to share in the losses should fraud emerge); Pozza, Jr. et al.,
supra note 4, at 131 (“[A] fundamental principle should be that all victims share the
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who innocently win in the market are similarly situated,
whether their winnings arise from legitimate or fraudulent
investment vehicles. All of them share responsibility for
restituting fraud’s victims. Implementing this insight need not
involve a novel crafting of policy. Instead, one or both of two
currently debated tax initiatives would do the trick, by
effectively raising the money needed to sustain a fraud
compensation fund.
The first is a variant on the financial transactions tax
(FTT), also called a Tobin Tax.221 While the idea for such a tax
emerged in the 1970s and was originally conceived as a
restraint on currency speculation, there has been a renewed
vigor in calls for adoption of a more encompassing FTT after
the 2008 financial meltdown.222 In particular, as its supporters
now envision it, the FTT would be assessed on most financial
transactions and would affect most asset classes.223 The recent
enthusiasm for an FTT stems from two policy goals that
supporters believe it will serve. First, it will curb “socially
useless” short-term equity transactions,224 and second, it will
impose some of the costs of risky bank activity on the banks
that contribute to systemic risk.225 But there is an additional
benefit, especially relevant here. An FTT would raise money
that could be used to compensate the victims of fraud. In
particular, investment winners would contribute money to the
compensation fund in proportion to the amount of their
winnings, and the FTT rate could vary depending on whether
the seller stood to reap a net gain from the transaction. A base
tax would apply in all cases and its revenues could serve both
policy goals described above. An additional tax could be levied
against investment gains, with the money raised financing a
pain on an equal basis. Simply because someone has cashed out before discovery or
received proceeds for years, which are traceable to other Ponzi victim investments,
should not allow them to have less pain than those who have received back little or
nothing from the Ponzi schemer.”).
221
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2009, at A39.
225
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fraud victim compensation fund. In this way, the added tax
would affirm the moral equivalence between the innocent
winners and losers in financial transactions, as well as the
moral equivalence between the innocent winners of a fraudulent
scheme and the innocent winners of a legitimate one.
A second option, which could be implemented in
addition to, or instead of, the varying rate FTT, would be to
answer the calls to raise the capital gains tax226 and to devote
some of the revenue garnered from the tax increase to a fraud
compensation fund. Here, too, the measure would recognize
that, from the perspective of the innocent investor, it may be
purely a matter of luck whether her investment dollars landed
in a legitimate investment vehicle or a fraudulent one.
The money set aside for fraud compensation—whether
funded through an FTT, an increase in the capital gains tax, or
both—would operate as a second tier of relief, after money
garnered from the fraudster and her associates had been
exhausted. Thus, trustees would still be needed in the wake of
a fraud in order to identify those with a culpable connection to
the fraud, to pursue clawbacks and punitive damages against
them, and to ferret out claimants who knew or should have
known about the fraud. Yet since either scheme would remove
the need to seek clawbacks from innocent investors, the fund’s
administration would be far more streamlined, and innocent
winners would save a significant amount of money that they
currently devote to defending themselves in clawback suits.
While the foregoing proposal paints in broad strokes
and many of the details remain to be worked out, it does
suggest that ready solutions exist for ensuring that victims of
fraud receive redress. More to the point, the proposed
initiatives would appropriately distribute the burdens of
restitution to all of those who profit from their investments.
CONCLUSION
Clawback suits against innocent beneficiaries of a fraud
can be sustained neither by statute nor by other doctrines.
Indeed, these suits are exceptional insofar as they demand that
innocent individuals or entities return money they reasonably
226

See, e.g., Eliot Spitzer, The “Romney Rule”: Why Raising Capital Gains Taxes
is Morally Right and Economically Wise, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2012, 12:32 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_best_policy/2012/02/the_romney_rule
_raising_capital_gains_taxes_is_both_morally_right_and_good_for_the_economy_.html.
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believed was theirs in order to redress another’s wrongdoing.
Yet the innocent winners of a fraud are no more responsible for
the losers’ losses than is anyone else. Although we should not
require that the victims of fraud bear their losses alone, we
need not require that restitution derive solely from those who
also had the misfortune of choosing the same, fraudulent
investment vehicle. The market is a place where fraud may
well be ineradicable.227 All those who subject their fates to its
whims and who come out ahead as a result should share
responsibility to redress the wreckage that fraud inflicts.
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See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Reforming a Corrupt Club, WASH. POST, July
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story.html; Felix Salmon, Why Finance Can’t Be Fixed with Better Regulation,
REUTERS BLOG (July 23, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 15675134.

